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INTRODUCTION
When responding to a request from a congressional committee, a
company’s counsel does not often consider immediately whether and
how the response could trigger an Executive Branch enforcement action.
But it has become increasingly necessary for those responding to con-
gressional requests to consider not only how the requesting committee
will view their response, but also how federal and state enforcement
agencies will view it.
Congressional committees have an assortment of authorities for en-
forcing their investigative requests.  Some of these authorities are infor-
mal, as when committee members inflict negative publicity on an entity
from whom information is sought, or when they require individuals to sit
for a deposition or transcribed interview.  More formally, committees can
hold individuals in contempt for impeding their investigations.  It is rare,
however, for Congress to use these enforcement authorities, and it has
ceased using some altogether.
At the same time, the Executive Branch has acted aggressively in a
number of recent cases to enforce compliance with congressional investi-
gations.  Using various statutory provisions, the Executive Branch has
sought to punish individuals and corporations for allegedly misinforming
Congress or failing to comply completely with congressional requests—
even in situations where compliance was voluntary and Congress took no
enforcement action.
This Article begins by reviewing Congress’s power to investigate
and discussing the authorities available to Congress and the Executive
Branch for enforcing congressional investigative prerogatives. The Arti-
cle then explores how each branch’s use of its available enforcement
authorities has changed over time, with the Executive Branch becoming
more aggressive in bringing enforcement actions that emanate from con-
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gressional investigations and Congress becoming increasingly reliant on
that enforcement activity.
The Article next discusses the effect of this shift in enforcement
activity and what it means for congressional investigations.  Among
other things, the Article notes how Executive Branch enforcement of
congressional investigations raises certain practical and constitutional
concerns that require individuals and corporations to approach such pro-
ceedings with increased caution.  Now more than ever, the Article ex-
plains, Executive Branch actions complement congressional
investigations or develop as a result of information elicited through them.
The result is that individuals and corporations may face penalties and
sanctions divorced from the political safeguards typically associated with
congressional action.
The Article concludes with a series of practice pointers designed to
address the real possibility that a congressional investigation could lead
to an Executive Branch enforcement proceeding.
I. CONGRESS’S POWER TO INVESTIGATE AND ENFORCE
INVESTIGATIVE REQUESTS
Congress may use “two separate but closely related powers” to
gather information: the power to investigate and the power to punish for
contempt.1  Through practice and by statute, Congress has developed va-
rious mechanisms for using these powers, each with a unique set of ac-
companying procedures and limitations.
A. Congress’s Investigative Power
Congress’s power to investigate is “inherent”2 in its authority “to
enact and appropriate under the Constitution.”3  Congress thus may in-
vestigate: (1) whenever it has a valid legislative purpose, defined broadly
1 Michael A. Zuckerman, Note, The Court of Congressional Contempt, 25 J.L. & POL.
41, 45 (2009).
2 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); see also MORTON ROSENBERG,
THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, WHEN CONGRESS COMES CALLING: A PRIMER ON THE PRINCI-
PLES, PRACTICES, AND PRAGMATICS OF LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY 9 (2009); James Hamilton et al.,
Congressional Investigations: Politics and Process, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1115, 1122 (2007)
[hereinafter Hamilton, Congressional Investigations].
3 See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959).  Indeed, because
Congress’s investigative power flows inherently from the Constitution itself, it can likely only
be permanently limited or modified by constitutional amendment. See In re Chapman, 166
U.S. 661, 671–72 (1897) (“We grant that Congress could not divest itself, or either of its
Houses, of the essential and inherent power to punish for contempt, in cases to which the
power of either House properly extended . . . .”); see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
176 (1926) (invalidating statute signed by a prior President that restricted the President’s in-
herent power under Article II to dismiss executive officers); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S.
128, 145, 147–48 (1872) (invalidating statute limiting President’s constitutionally derived par-
don power).
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to include gathering information for purposes of legislating, overseeing
governmental matters, or informing the public about the workings of
government; and (2) when it is discharging an enumerated power, such
as when a House resolves an election dispute.4
Congress gathers information through requests for information, by
conducting interviews, and by hearing testimony.5  Any congressional
body or representative may issue a request for information, seeking doc-
uments or explanations from individuals or corporations.6  Testimony, by
contrast, must be heard at a hearing or taken via a deposition.7  Hearings
are generally held by committees and subcommittees pursuant to gov-
erning legislative rules, and they are held in open session unless the com-
mittee or subcommittee votes to close proceedings because of the
sensitive nature of offered testimony.8  Depositions are conducted by
staff of the few committees authorized to take depositions,9 thereby al-
4 See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 n.15 (1975); Reed v.
Cnty. Comm’rs of Del. Cnty., 277 U.S. 376, 388 (1928); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135,
177 (1927).
5 See Michael D. Bopp & DeLisa Lay, The Availability of Common Law Privileges for
Witnesses in Congressional Investigations, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 897, 900–01 (2012)
[hereinafter Bopp & Lay, The Availability of Common Law Privileges].
6 See id. at 902.
7 See id. at 901.  Congress can also take de facto testimony through a transcribed inter-
view.  In a transcribed interview, the witness is interviewed in a deposition-like format.  Al-
though the interview is transcribed by a court reporter, the witness is not under oath, and the
formal rules of depositions do not apply (for example, counsel are often permitted to make
speaking objections in transcribed interviews).  Although the witness is not under oath, lying
in a transcribed interview violates 18 U.S.C. § 1001. See infra Part II.A.1.
8 See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, R. XXVI(5)(b), S. Doc. No. 113-18, 113th
Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (2013) (authorizing the holding of closed hearings if testimony is being
taken regarding (1) national security matters, (2) internal personnel matters, (3) matters that
will result in criminal prosecution or an unwarranted invasion of privacy, (4) sensitive law
enforcement matters, (5) trade secrets, or (6) other matters required by law to remain secret);
see also RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, R. XI(2)(g)(2), 114th Cong. (Karen L.
Haas ed., 2015) (substantially similar).
9 In the 114th Congress, the House Committees on Oversight and Government Reform,
Education and the Workforce, Energy and Commerce, Financial Services, Science, Space, and
Technology, and Ways and Means have authorized deposition authority. See Michael Bopp et
al., The Power to Investigate: Table of Authorities of House and Senate Committees for the
114th Congress, GIBSON DUNN ALERT (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publica-
tions/Documents/Power-to-Investigate—Table-of-Authorities—House-and-Senate-Commit-
tees-114th-Congress.pdf [hereinafter M. Bopp, The Power to Investigate].  To exercise this
authority, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform may compel depositions by
subpoena, but committee rules also require that at least one member be present for any deposi-
tion (unless waived by deponent). See 161 CONG. REC. H864, at R. 15 (daily ed. Feb. 9,
2015).  Five Senate committees have Senate authorization to take depositions, including the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, the Committee on Aging, the Committee on Indian Affairs, and the Intelligence
Committee. See M. Bopp, The Power to Investigate, supra note 9. Notably, the rules of R
several of these committees state that a deposition notice is not compulsory unless accompa-
nied by a subpoena. See, e.g., 161 CONG. REC. S413, S415, at R. 5K(1) (daily ed. Jan. 22,
2015); Rules—Jurisdiction and Authority, S. COMM. ON AGING R. VII.1, http://www.ag-
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lowing those committees to obtain testimony quickly and confiden-
tially—and occasionally remotely—without holding hearings.
Testimony offered at hearings is unsworn unless the relevant chairperson
or committee decides otherwise; deposition testimony is always sworn.10
Regardless of whether testimony is under oath, all witnesses have a right
to legal counsel,11 are entitled to invoke certain constitutional privileges,
and are almost always permitted to invoke common law privileges.12
Congressional bodies and representatives usually seek voluntary
compliance with information requests and calls to testify.13  When volun-
tary requests prove ineffective, however, lawmakers may seek to compel
compliance through issuance of a congressional subpoena.14  No consti-
tutional provision explicitly gives Congress the authority to issue sub-
ing.senate.gov/about/rules (last visited Mar. 6, 2016).  Moreover, arguably as a general pro-
position of common law, a subpoena is required to compel a non-party deponent to appear.
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(1), 45(a)(1)(B).  Other Senate committees—namely the Agri-
culture, Commerce, Foreign Relations, and Small Business and Entrepreneurship commit-
tees—authorize depositions in their rules, but it is not clear that such deposition authority is
authorized by the Senate and thus enforceable. See M. Bopp, The Power to Investigate, supra
note 9. In addition, at least nineteen special investigating committees have had deposition R
authority. See ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 11 n.49.  And the Senate or House may grant R
deposition authority to a standing committee for a particular investigation. See, e.g., 155
CONG. REC. H6, H9 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2009) (authorizing House Judiciary Committee under
§ 4(f)(2) to conduct staff depositions to investigate the firing of U.S. Attorneys).
10 See Hamilton, Congressional Investigations, supra note 2, at 1157; see also 2 U.S.C. R
§ 191 (2012) (authorizing congressional committees to administer oaths to witnesses).
11 See, e.g., RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, R. XI(2)(k)(3), 114th Cong.
(Karen L. Haas ed., 2015) (“Witnesses at hearings may be accompanied by their own counsel
for the purpose of advising them concerning their constitutional rights.”); RULES OF PROCE-
DURE FOR THE SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. HOMELAND
SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, R. 8, S. Doc. No. 114-13, 114th Cong., 1st Sess. 12
(2015) (“Counsel retained by any witness and accompanying such witness shall be permitted
to be present during the testimony of such witness at any public or executive hearing, and to
advise such witness while he or she is testifying, of his or her legal rights . . . .”); Rules—
Jurisdiction and Authority, supra note 9, at R. P. II.6 (“A witness’s counsel shall be permitted R
to be present during his testimony at any public or closed hearing or depositions or staff
interview to advise such witness of his or her rights . . . .”); see also ROSENBERG, supra note 2, R
at 24.
12 See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957) (“The Bill of Rights is appli-
cable to investigations as to all forms of government action.  Witnesses cannot be compelled to
give evidence against themselves.  They cannot be subjected to unreasonable search and
seizure.  Nor can the First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, religion, or political belief
and association be abridged.”); see also Bopp & Lay, The Availability of Common Law Privi-
leges, supra note 5, at 905–31. R
13 See Bopp & Lay, The Availability of Common Law Privileges, supra note 5, at R
904–05.  In the personal experience of the authors, there are exceptions to this rule, with
certain committees, notably the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, known for
initially proceeding by subpoena as to the private sector.
14 ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 8 (citing McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 R
(1927)); Hamilton, Congressional Investigations, supra note 2, at 1124. R
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poenas, but the Supreme Court has recognized that the issuance of
subpoenas is “a legitimate use by Congress of its power to investigate.”15
The subpoena power is vested in each House of Congress.16  Senate
Rule XXVI(1) and House Rule XI(2)(m)(1) specifically empower stand-
ing committees and subcommittees to issue subpoenas, and Senate or
House resolutions may authorize special committees to do so as well.17
Each House and committee have extensive discretion to establish rules
governing the issuance of subpoenas.  Some committees, for example,
allow committee chairmen to issue subpoenas unilaterally, while others
authorize the issuance of a subpoena only with the consent of the ranking
member or a majority of committee members.18  Rules governing com-
mittee practice and authorities are adopted at the beginning of each Con-
gress and published in the Congressional Record.19
A congressional subpoena is subject to few legal challenges.  The
Supreme Court, in fact, has held that courts’ power to review congres-
sional subpoenas is sharply limited by the Constitution’s Speech or De-
bate Clause,20 explaining that the clause provides “an absolute bar to
interference” with the compulsory process.21  Thus, to contest a sub-
poena, a witness generally must first refuse to comply with it, risk being
cited for contempt, and then raise any objections as a defense to prosecu-
tion.22  In other words, unlike with Article II or III processes, there is
15 See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 (1975).  The Su-
preme Court has justified the use of congressional subpoenas by explaining that:
A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of informa-
tion respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change;
and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information—
which not infrequently is true—recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Experience has taught that mere requests for such information often are unavailing,
and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so
some means of compulsion are essential to obtain what is needed.
McGrain, 273 U.S. at 175; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 137–38 (1976).
16 ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 8. R
17 Id.; LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31836, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGA-
TIONS: SUBPOENAS AND CONTEMPT POWER 7 (2003).
18 See M. Bopp, The Power to Investigate, supra note 9 (detailing, among other things, R
the specific rules governing each committee’s subpoena authority).  In addition, in the personal
experience of the authors, before a congressional subpoena issues, it is reviewed by either the
House General Counsel or Senate Legal Counsel.  House Rule II.2(d)(1) also states that House
committees may only issue subpoenas under the seal of the Clerk of the House.  Congressional
subpoenas are served by the U.S. Marshal’s office, committee staff, or the Senate or House
Sergeants-at-Arms. See ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 9. R
19 See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, R. XI(2)(a)(2), 114th Cong. (Karen L.
Haas ed., 2015); STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, R. XXVI(5)(b), S. Doc. No. 113-18, 113th
Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (2013).
20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; see ALISSA M. DOLAN & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RE-
SEARCH SERV., R42648, THE SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE: CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 2 (2012).
21 Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503, 515 (1975).
22 ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 9. R
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virtually no pre-enforcement review of a congressional subpoena.23
Moreover, the only valid objections to the enforcement of a congres-
sional subpoena are that it: (1) was not issued pursuant to a proper legis-
lative purpose within the jurisdiction of the issuing body; (2) fails to
comport with applicable legislative rules; or (3) infringes on the constitu-
tional rights of the subpoenaed witness.24  Even these objections, how-
ever, are read narrowly in Congress’s favor, with courts requiring the
enforcement of subpoenas unless there is “no reasonable possibility” that
the sought information will prove relevant to the “general subject” of an
investigation25 for which Congress need not explicitly state an intended
result.26
B. Congress’s Contempt Powers
When the target of a congressional investigation fails to comply
with a subpoena or otherwise obstructs the investigation, lawmakers may
seek to enforce their investigative authority by holding that person or
corporation in contempt.27  The issuance of a contempt citation may lead
to a fine or imprisonment.28  There are three forms of contempt available
to Congress: inherent, criminal, and civil.29
1. Inherent Contempt Power
Congress’s inherent contempt power, like its investigative power,
“is not specifically granted by the Constitution, but is considered neces-
sary to investigate and legislate effectively.”30  The Supreme Court has
recognized this power, reasoning that, without it, Congress would be
23 See infra Part III.B.
24 See Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187–204 (1957); see also Shelton v.
United States, 327 F.2d 601, 606–07 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (finding a subpoena authorized by a
subcommittee chairman invalid because the Senate resolution conferring subpoena power re-
quired action by the subcommittee as a whole); United States v. Reinecke, 524 F.2d 435 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Liveright v. United States, 347 F.2d 473, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
25 Senate Select Comm. on Ethics v. Packwood, 845 F. Supp. 17, 20–21 (D.D.C. 1994)
(stay pending appeal denied); Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U.S. 1319
(1994) (quoting United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1997)); see also Okla.
Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946).
26 See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 670 (1897) (“[I]t was certainly not necessary that
the resolutions should declare in advance what the Senate mediated doing when the investiga-
tion was concluded.”); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176 (1927) (deeming sufficient
statement requesting information “for such legislative and other action as the Senate may deem
necessary and proper”).
27 ALISSA M. DOLAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30240, CONGRESSIONAL OVER-
SIGHT MANUAL 33 (2014).
28 Zuckerman, supra note 1, at 54. R
29 Bopp & Lay, The Availability of Common Law Privileges, supra note 5, at 902. R
30 TODD GARVEY & ALISSA M. DOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34114, CONGRESS’S
CONTEMPT POWER AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS: A SKETCH 4
(2014).
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“exposed to every indignity and interruption that rudeness, caprice, or
even conspiracy, may meditate against it.”31
Congress’s inherent contempt power extends to prohibit two broad
categories of acts: (1) unlawful interference with Congress or its mem-
bers’ powers—including bribery, assault, or the delay of a session or a
member; and (2) refusal to comply with lawful congressional process or
commands.32  As an “inherent” power, no statute or rule specifically ar-
ticulates the limits of the power.  Over time, however, Congress and the
courts have recognized a set of applicable procedures.33
To exercise its inherent contempt authority, the House or Senate
must first pass a resolution charging a person with contempt.34  The reso-
lution must state the allegations giving rise to the charge.35  The resolu-
tion also will contain a clause directing that the resolution be served as a
citation on the defendant, or a clause directing the presiding officer to
issue a warrant to the Sergeant at Arms to attach the defendant to answer
before the bar of the chamber.36  The full House or Senate may then hold
a complete trial for an accused individual, or they may direct a commit-
tee to conduct evidentiary proceedings and make recommendations for a
verdict and punishment, with debate on these recommendations and dis-
position and punishment occurring at the bar of the full chamber.37
Whether before the bar of a chamber or committee, an individual accused
of contempt typically is entitled to hear the charges against him; have
access to counsel, defense witnesses, and the evidence against him; and
examine witnesses.38
If, after a trial, a chamber of Congress finds an individual guilty of
contempt, that chamber may imprison the individual either to punish for
contumacy or to coerce compliance with a lawful process or command.39
Although there is no direct precedent on point, there is a strong argument
that Congress has power to fine an individual to the same ends.40  Con-
gress may not, however, imprison a witness under its inherent contempt
authority after expiration of the session in which the contempt oc-
31 Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 228 (1821); see also McGrain, 273 U.S. at 178.
32 Zuckerman, supra note 1, at 52–53. R
33 See, e.g., Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 144, 147 (1935).
34 See TODD GARVEY & ALISSA M. DOLAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34097, CON-
GRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL SUBPOENAS: LAW,
HISTORY, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE 11–18 (2014) [hereinafter CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT
POWER].
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 See, e.g., Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S 204 (1821) (reviewing House procedures); see
also Thomas L. Shriner Jr., Note, Legislative Contempt and Due Process: The Groppi Cases,
46 IND. L.J. 480, 491 (1971).
39 ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 15. R
40 CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER, supra note 34, at 12. R
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curred.41  Imprisoned individuals may challenge their confinement by fil-
ing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus or by suing the Sergeant-at-
Arms who made the arrest for trespass, false imprisonment, or both.42  A
court reviewing such an objection is limited to determining whether Con-
gress had jurisdiction and complied with due process requirements; it
may not consider whether an arrest or conviction for contempt is based in
fact.43
2. Criminal Contempt Power
To augment its inherent contempt authority, Congress enacted a
statutory criminal contempt procedure in 1857.44  Congress decided to
supplement—not supplant—its inherent contempt power because it felt
that power was, in most cases, too cumbersome, ineffective, and infre-
quently used (only fourteen contempt actions were initiated before enact-
ment of the criminal contempt statute).45  Congress recognized that the
political and procedural difficulties associated with its inherent contempt
power, coupled with the limitation on punishment beyond a congres-
sional adjournment date, often made use of that power impractical.46
Codified today at 2 U.S.C. §§ 192 and 194, the criminal contempt
statute provides in part:
Every person who having been summoned as a witness
by the authority of either House of Congress to give tes-
timony or to produce papers upon any matter under in-
quiry before either House, . . . or any committee of either
House of Congress, willfully makes default, or who,
having appeared, refuses to answer any question perti-
41 Hamilton, Congressional Investigations, supra note 2, at 1132–33. R
42 See Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917); see also United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d
670, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Theodore Sky, Judicial Review of Congressional Investigations: Is
There an Alternative to Contempt?, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 400 n.3 (1962).
43 In Jurney v. MacCracken, for example, a lawyer arrested for contempt of the Senate
sought release pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. See 294 U.S. 125, 144, 147 (1935).  The
lawyer was accused of allowing a client to remove from his office and destroy certain files that
had been subpoenaed by a special committee of the Senate.  The lawyer did not deny that he
had allowed his client to remove and destroy the files, but he argued that the Senate lacked
authority to arrest him simply “with a view to punishing him,” as he had eventually produced
every requested “paper of every kind and description in his possession.” Id. The Supreme
Court rejected this argument. Id. It held that Congress’s “power to punish a private citizen for
a past and completed act” was well established so long as that act was “of a nature to obstruct
the performance of the duties of the Legislature.” Id. at 148.  The Senate thereafter found the
lawyer guilty and sentenced him to ten days imprisonment. See 78 CONG. REC. 2468, 2495–97
(daily ed. Feb. 14, 1934); see also Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972); Kilbourn v. Thomp-
son, 103 U.S. 168, 196 (1881).
44 See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897); CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER, supra note
34, at 6. R
45 CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER, supra note 34, at 18. R
46 See id.
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nent to the question under inquiry, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not
more than [$100,000] nor less than $100 and imprison-
ment in a common jail for not less than one month nor
more than twelve months.47
A “person” thus may be punished under the statute for “willfully” failing
to produce documents or refusing to answer “pertinent” questions in re-
sponse to a congressional “summons.”48
The statute does not define “person,” but, unless otherwise stated or
suggested by context, the term elsewhere in the United States Code refers
to both organizations and individuals.  The statute also does not define
“pertinent” or “summons.”  Courts have interpreted “pertinent” questions
to include those that are “within [a] committee’s scope of inquiry” as
“authorized” by governing legislative rules.49  For example, in United
States v. Watkins, the Supreme Court held that an individual could not be
convicted under Section 192 for refusing to answer questions about the
political beliefs of persons unaffiliated with organized labor as part of a
House subcommittee hearing focused only on labor union activities.50
As for the term “summoned,” in the event that a witness simply refuses
to appear, it could arguably apply to congressional requests for voluntary
compliance with an investigation, but, as a textual matter, it does not
appear that the term encompasses more than an investigative demand
backed by a subpoena.  To the extent the witness appears, but then ref-
uses to testify on at least some point, the Supreme Court has stated: “Sec-
tion 102 [referring to 2 U.S.C. § 192] plainly extends to a case where a
person voluntarily appears as a witness without being summoned as well
as to the case of one required to attend.”51
Importantly, while Congress initiates an action under the criminal
contempt statute, the Executive Branch prosecutes it.52  This is the most
47 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194 (2012).
48 See ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 10–11. R
49 Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576, 577 (1958) (“Inasmuch as petitioner’s refusal
to answer related to questions not clearly pertinent to the subject on which the two-member
subcommittee conducting the hearing had been authorized to take testimony, the conditions
necessary to sustain a conviction for deliberately refusing to answer questions pertinent to the
authorized subject matter of a congressional hearing are wanting.”); see also United States v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 330 (1950); Comment, Contempt of Congress and “Pertinency”: A Stan-
dard of Culpability, 11 STAN. L. REV. 164 (1958).
50 United States v. Watkins, 354 U.S. 178, 213–14 (1957).
51 Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 291 (1929), overruled by United States v.
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995); see also CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER, supra note 34, at 53 R
(noting that “the law applies whether the individual is subpoenaed or appears voluntarily and
then refuses to testify”) (citing Sinclair, 279 U.S. 263).
52 See 2 U.S.C. § 194.  Section 194 specifically provides: “Whenever a witness sum-
moned as mentioned in section 192 of this title fails to appear to testify or fails to produce any
books, papers, records, or documents, as required, or whenever any witness so summoned
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critical difference from Congress’s inherent contempt authority, and it is
the factor that makes the statute at once both significantly more effective
and subject to political vagaries.  Rather than requiring either House or a
committee to issue a contempt charge and hold a burdensome trial, the
statute requires a House of Congress merely to approve a contempt cita-
tion sent up by a committee.53  If Congress is not in session, the presid-
ing officer of the House or Senate may approve the citation.54  The
contempt citation is then certified by the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House, after which, according to the statute, it becomes
the “duty” of the appropriate U.S. Attorney “to bring the matter before
the grand jury for its action.”55
This procedure affords Congress a more efficient path to enforce its
investigative demands, but it also surrenders a substantial amount of con-
trol over contempt proceedings to the Executive.  Indeed, U.S. Attorneys
occasionally have refused to enforce contempt citations referred by Con-
gress—most notably in the case of Congress seeking to compel an Exec-
utive Branch official to comply with a subpoena.56
refuses to answer any question pertinent to the subject under inquiry . . . and the fact of such
failure or failures is reported to either House . . . it shall be the duty of the said President of the
Senate or Speaker of the House, as the case may be, to certify, and he shall so certify, the
statement of facts aforesaid under the seal of the Senate or House, as the case may be, to the
appropriate United States attorney, whose duty it shall be to bring the matter before the grand
jury for its action.”
53 Id.; see also Wilson v. United States, 369 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Ex parte
Frankfeld, 32 F. Supp. 915 (D.D.C. 1940); 4 LEWIS DESCHLER, DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS OF
THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ch. 15, §§ 17–22 (1977); DOLAN ET AL., supra note 27, R
at 33–34.
54 2 U.S.C. § 194; DOLAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 33–34. R
55 DOLAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 34. R
56 In Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, for instance, then-Attorney General Michael
Mukasey ordered the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia not to act on the contempt
citations referred by the House of Representatives against executive officials Joshua Bolten
and Harriet Miers. See 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 63–64 (D.D.C. 2008); see also Timothy T. Mas-
trogiacomo, Note, Showdown in the Rose Garden: Congressional Contempt, Executive Privi-
lege, and the Role of the Courts, 99 GEO. L.J. 163, 164 (2010).  In his order, Attorney General
Mukasey emphasized the “longstanding position” of the Department of Justice that, at least
when the witness cited for contempt is an Executive Branch official asserting the claim of
executive privilege, the Executive is under no obligation to prosecute the witness. See Letter
from Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney Gen., to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House of Repre-
sentatives (Feb. 29, 2008).  Indeed, the Department of Justice has gone so far as to opine that
setting aside executive privilege, the statute itself does not impose a mandatory duty.  Prosecu-
tion for Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Official Who Has Asserted a Claim of
Executive Privilege, 8 Op. O.L.C. 101, 118–24 (1984). The Department has justified this
position primarily on the basis of its recognized “absolute discretion” over prosecutions,
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974), and on its related concern that reading the
statute to confer a duty on the Executive to bring a prosecution requested by Congress would
undermine the constitutional separation of powers. See Letter from James M. Cole, Deputy
Attorney Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives (June 28, 2012)
(refusing to present to a grand jury contempt allegations certified by the House against Attor-
ney General Eric Holder).  In any event, even if a U.S. Attorney were required by the statute to
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Because the statute is punitive and not coercive, if a person is found
guilty of violating the criminal contempt statute, he or she may not purge
his or her guilt by complying with Congress’s demands.57  Additionally,
he or she may remain imprisoned beyond the end of the session of the
Congress that he or she disobeyed.58  In these ways, the statute can offer
the possibility of harsher punishment than that available under Con-
gress’s inherent contempt authority.
3. Civil Contempt Power
In addition to its criminal contempt powers, each House of Con-
gress also may seek civil contempt sanctions against uncooperative per-
sons.  The Senate’s civil contempt power is codified at 2 U.S.C.
§§ 288b(b) and 288d; the House’s authority to seek civil contempt sanc-
tions can potentially be inferred from its other powers.  In any civil con-
tempt action initiated by Congress, the congressional chamber petitions a
federal court to order a person to comply with a congressional request.59
Assuming a court issues such an order, a non-compliant person may be
found in contempt of court, rather than in contempt of Congress.60
Sections 288b(b) and 288d specifically authorize the Senate to seek
enforcement of certain legislative subpoenas in a U.S. District Court.61
The sections provide that the Senate—pursuant to certain procedures—
may order by resolution its Office of Legal Counsel to bring a civil ac-
tion “to enforce, to secure a declaratory judgment concerning the validity
of, or to prevent a threatened failure or refusal to comply with, any sub-
poena or order issued by the Senate or a committee or a subcommittee of
the Senate.”62  Notably, however, the related jurisdictional statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1365, contains the following proviso:
present evidence of contempt to a grand jury, he or she would still “retain considerable power
to prevent a contempt prosecution from going forward.”  Hamilton, Congressional Investiga-
tions, supra note 2, at 1135.  Namely, the U.S. Attorney could present evidence and argument R
to persuade the grand jury not to indict the witness, refuse to sign a returned indictment, enter
a nolle prosequi, or offer no evidence at trial. See id.; see also DOLAN ET AL., supra note 27, at R
34; CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER, supra note 34, at 21. R
57 CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER, supra note 34, at 21. R
58 See, e.g., United States v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200, 202 (2d Cir. 1952); United States v.
Tobin, 195 F. Supp. 588, 617 (D.D.C. 1961); see also CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER, supra
note 34, at 4, 8; DOLAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 33–34. R
59 CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER, supra note 34, at 23. R
60 Id.
61 2 U.S.C. §§ 288b(b), 288d (2012); Bopp & Lay, The Availability of Common Law
Privileges, supra note 5, at 903. R
62 2 U.S.C. § 288d.  The statute specifically sets forth the following procedural rules that
must be followed before the Senate may consider a resolution to seek enforcement of a sub-
poena.  First, the rules require a resolution seeking enforcement of a subpoena to be reported to
the full Senate by a majority of the committee issuing the subpoena or the committee of which
a subcommittee issued the subpoena.  Second, the rules require the filed report to contain a
statement of (a) the procedure followed in issuing the subpoena, (b) the extent to which the
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This section shall not apply to an action to enforce, to
secure a declaratory judgment concerning the validity of,
or to prevent a threatened refusal to comply with, any
subpoena or order issued to an officer or employee of the
Executive Branch of the Federal Government acting
within his or her official capacity, except that this sec-
tion shall apply if the refusal to comply is based on the
assertion of a personal privilege or objection and is not
based on a governmental privilege or objection the asser-
tion of which has been authorized by the Executive
Branch of the Federal Government.
This proviso was based in part on the opinion of Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Antonin Scalia that a statute authorizing a civil action against an
official claiming executive privilege would be unconstitutional.63
By contrast, the House—which does not have a civil contempt stat-
ute—may arguably pursue a civil contempt action by passing a resolu-
tion creating a special investigatory panel with the power to seek judicial
orders or by granting the power to seek such orders to a standing com-
mittee.64  The full House must adopt a resolution finding the individual
in contempt and authorizing a committee or the House General Counsel
to file suit against a noncompliant witness in federal court.65  Arguably,
the Senate retains the same discretion to act outside of the jurisdiction
provided by 2 U.S.C. §§ 288b(b) and 288d.
When either House of Congress petitions a federal court to enforce
a subpoena, the court is limited in its review of the subpoena.  Indeed,
even if the court determines that a subpoena “does not meet applicable
legal standards for enforcement,” the most it can do is refuse to issue an
order instructing compliance.66  If a court orders compliance, a non-com-
pliant witness may be tried in summary proceedings for contempt of
court, with sanctions available to enforce compliance.67
party subpoenaed complied with the subpoena, (c) any objections or privileges raised by the
subpoenaed party, and (d) the comparative effectiveness of bringing a civil action as opposed
to certifying a criminal action for contempt of Congress or initiating a contempt proceeding
under the Senate’s inherent contempt authority.  2 U.S.C. § 288d; see also CONGRESS’S CON-
TEMPT POWER, supra note 34, at 24 (citing S. REP. NO. 95-170, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 R
(1977)).
63 See CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER, supra note 34, at 26. R
64 ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 17–18; see also Bopp & Lay, The Availability of Com- R
mon Law Privileges, supra note 5, at 903. R
65 See ROSENBERG, supra note 2, at 17–18; see also Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, R
558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C.), stay granted, 542 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
66 CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER, supra note 34, at 26. R
67 Bopp & Lay, The Availability of Common Law Privileges, supra note 5, at 903; see R
also DOLAN ET AL., supra note 27, at 34. R
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C. Congress’s Use of Its Contempt Powers
Despite the various contempt powers available to it, Congress rarely
uses its authority to enforce investigative demands.  In fact, Congress has
almost entirely restricted application of its contempt powers to high-
ranking Executive Branch officials, and it virtually never follows through
on threats to hold a private individual or corporation in contempt.  Nota-
bly, Congress has not invoked its inherent contempt power since 1934.68
Moreover, Congress has not sought criminal or civil contempt sanctions
against a non-government entity since 1986 and 1995, respectively.69
It is not surprising that Congress has not used its inherent contempt
authority in eighty years, as that authority has long been recognized as
cumbersome and inefficient.  However, that Congress rarely uses its stat-
utory contempt powers is a relatively new development.  As recently as
the 1980s, Congress resolved to seek contempt sanctions against more
than ten non-Executive Branch individuals.70  Before then, the frequency
of contempt resolutions issued to non-government persons was even
greater.71
The wane in Congress’s use of its contempt powers does not mean,
of course, that contempt is no longer a readily available enforcement
tool.72  It is.  Moreover, even when a formal contempt resolution is not
issued, its threat and preliminary consideration alone can be an unpleas-
ant and damaging experience for the target of a committee’s attention.73
Nonetheless, the decreased issuance of contempt resolutions is notable.
The decline in congressional contempt resolutions is not likely due
to an increase in compliance with congressional demands; as one com-
menter has noted, “[l]ying to Congress is one of Washington’s more
68 See Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 127, 144 (1935); United Press, Senate Glee-
ful, Cracks Down on Ex-Hoover Aide: MacCracken’s Trial on Contempt Charge Is Resumed
After ‘Prisoner’ Loses in Every Attempt to Evade Arrest, PITTSBURG PRESS, Feb. 13, 1934, at
1, 6; see also Hamilton, Congressional Investigations, supra note 2, at 1133. R
69 See H.R. Res. 384, 99th Cong. (1986); 132 CONG. REC. 3028 (1986) (recording votes
on criminal contempt resolutions against real estate investor Ralph Bernstein and attorney
Joseph Bernstein for their refusal to answer questions regarding the embezzlement of funds in
a closed hearing before the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs); S. Res. 199,
104th Cong. (1995); 141 CONG. REC. 37,761 (1995) (recording votes on civil contempt resolu-
tion against William H. Kennedy, III for refusing to comply with subpoena issued by the
Special Committee to Investigate Whitewater Development Corporation).  Note that former
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) official Lois Lerner had retired before she was voted in
contempt by the House of Representatives in May 2014, making her a private citizen at the
time. See infra Part III.A.1.
70 CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER, supra note 34, at 67–78. R
71 See CARL BECK, CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS: A STUDY OF THE PROSECUTIONS INITIATED
BY THE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, 1945–1957, at 217–40 (1959).
72 See Bopp & Lay, The Availability of Common Law Privileges, supra note 5, at 904. R
73 See id. at 904–05.
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[e]nduring [t]raditions.”74  It is also not the result of a decrease in con-
gressional desire for full compliance with investigations.  To be sure, the
procedures and political capital necessary for passing a contempt resolu-
tion are significant, and the public’s attention span for investigations may
be shorter than in years past, but these difficulties are no greater than
those facing other legislative actions.  Moreover, the decrease in con-
tempt sanctions is wholly disproportionate to the relative increase in con-
gressional investigations.75  Since the 1980s, Congress has seen an
increase in the use of staff depositions76 and electronic discovery, which
have allowed it to gather more information than ever before.  Thus, there
is no obvious change in Congress’s dealings that explains its markedly
decreased use of its contempt powers.
Instead, a likely explanation for Congress’s diminished use of its
contempt powers is that the Executive Branch has now become an active
enforcer of congressional investigative demands.  As discussed below,
the Executive Branch has sought, in a variety of contexts and using sev-
eral criminal laws, to punish individuals and corporations for allegedly
misinforming Congress or inadequately responding to congressional re-
quests.  The Executive Branch occasionally acts in concert with congres-
sional actions, but, more often than not, it acts to enforce Congress’s
demands as it sees fit.  This executive action affects the compliance
calculus both for Congress and persons in receipt of congressional re-
quests, and by raising the stakes of noncompliance, it reduces the need
for Congress to enforce its own demands.
II. EXECUTIVE BRANCH ENFORCEMENT OF
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
There has always been a certain measure of coordination between
congressional investigations and Executive Branch actions.  Topics of
congressional inquiry often overlap with topics of interest to the Execu-
tive, with both branches seeking to identify, reform, or punish bad actors
and inefficiencies.  However, recent efforts of the Executive Branch to
coordinate with, and enforce, congressional investigations are unprece-
dented.  Recognizing congressional inquiries as an expedient vehicle for
gathering information relevant to its own investigations, the Executive
Branch is now regularly using criminal laws to punish incomplete and
untruthful responses to Congress.
74 P.J. Meitl, The Perjury Paradox: The Amazing Under-Enforcement of the Laws Re-
garding Lying to Congress, 25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 547, 547 (2007).
75 Indeed, based on the authors’ count, in the 110th Congress alone, there were 486
congressional investigations.
76 See Hamilton, Congressional Investigations, supra note 2, at 1153. R
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A. Relevant Criminal Laws
The Executive Branch may use a number of criminal laws to seek
punishment for inadequate compliance with congressional requests.
These laws not only collectively cover a broader range of conduct than
the conduct punishable under Congress’s contempt powers, but they also
offer more severe punishments.  More importantly, none of these laws
require congressional input or acquiescence; the Executive Branch may
pursue prosecutions under them irrespective of Congress’s views.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1001
Section 1001 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code is often a cornerstone of
Executive Branch efforts to enforce congressional investigations.  The
Section prohibits, among other things, the obstruction of justice by false
statements made knowingly and willfully in any “administrative matter”
or “any investigation or review, conducted pursuant to the authority of
any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress,
consistent with applicable rules of the House or Senate.”77  Congress
specifically drafted this language to ensure the criminality of false state-
ments made “within [its] jurisdiction.”78
Notably, the legislative history of Section 1001 emphasizes that the
statute’s application to statements made to members or staff in connec-
tion with investigations “conducted pursuant to the authority” of Con-
gress is meant to limit its application to “duly authorized investigative
matters.”79  As a result, “unsworn statements made to or before Congress
and which are not furnished pursuant [to] a duly authorized investiga-
tion” are exempted from the statute’s reach.80  The legislative history
77 18 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (2012); see also United States v. Boffil-Rivera, 607 F.3d 736, 740
(11th Cir. 2010) (outlining the elements needed to convict a defendant under § 1001); United
States v. Geisen, 612 F.3d 471, 489 (6th Cir. 2010) (also outlining the elements needed to
convict a defendant under § 1001).
78 18 U.S.C. § 1001(c).  An original version of § 1001 applied only to matters of “any
department or agency of the United States.” See United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 504
(1955).  After the Supreme Court ruled that this language did not apply to the Judiciary, Hub-
bard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 714 (1995) (holding that a federal court is “neither a
‘department’ nor an ‘agency’ within the meaning of § 1001”), various lower courts and com-
menters concluded that it similarly did not apply to the Legislative Branch.  See, e.g., United
States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640, 658–59 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the applicability of § 1001
is limited to the Executive Branch).  However, Congress amended § 1001 in 1996 to clarify
that the statute did apply to false statements made to Congress. See United States v. Pickett,
353 F.3d 62, 65 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (discussing the effect of the 1996 amendments).
79 H.R. REP. NO. 104-680, at 5 (1996). “Administrative matters” refers to, among other
things, financial disclosures submitted by members of Congress and allows the Executive
Branch to prosecute members who have “ghost employee schemes, knowingly submit false
vouchers, and purchase personal goods and services with taxpayer dollars.” Id.
80 Id. at 8; see also id. at 5 (“A criminal statute should not be broadly formulated . . . .
Rather, certainty must be based on a specifically-tailored statute that criminalizes only what is
intended to be a crime.”).
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also makes clear that a “duly authorized investigation” is one initiated
“through a formal action of a House or Senate committee, or the whole
House or Senate.”81  Thus, “an inquiry conducted by a Member of Con-
gress or the staff of such Member . . . is not a ‘duly authorized investiga-
tion’ for purposes of section 1001.”82  But so long as a statement is made
in connection with a “duly authorized investigation”—including to an
individual Member or staff acting in furtherance of that investigation—it
is subject to the statute’s terms; it does not matter whether the statement
is made pursuant to a subpoena, whether it is sworn, or whether it is
transcribed.83  In addition, Section 1001—like all the criminal laws
available for the independent use of the Executive—covers false state-
ments regardless of whether those statements pertained to questions that
were “pertinent” to the subject under investigation.84  The statute there-
fore applies more broadly than Congress’s criminal contempt powers.85
However, a recent change in the government’s interpretation of Sec-
tion 1001 could potentially limit the Executive’s ability to use this statute
to enforce compliance with congressional investigations.  The federal
courts of appeal have long been split as to whether Section 1001’s
“knowingly and willfully”86 language requires the government to prove
that the defendant deliberately made false statements and simply knew
the statements to be false, or that the defendant also knew that making
such statements was unlawful.87  Until the spring of 2014, the Depart-
81 Id. at 9.  The House report goes on to clarify that “an employee in a Member’s office
who contacts an executive branch employee [for] information about a particular matter of
interest to the Member is not engaged in a ‘duly authorized investigation.’  Neither is the
inquiry which is made by a . . . committee employee at the direction of the Chairman of the
Committee, even when the inquiry pertains to a matter within such committee’s jurisdiction, a
‘duly authorized investigation’ for purposes of section 1001.” Id. at 9–10.
82 Id. at 9.  Of course, under many committees’ rules, the Chairman alone can authorize
an investigation. See, e.g., 161 CONG. REC. H862, H864, at R. 12 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2015).
83 See, e.g., Indictment at 10, United States v. Clemens, 793 F. Supp. 2d 236 (D.D.C.
2009) (No. 10-cr-223) (accusing Roger Clemens of lying to a committee staff member during
sworn testimony related to a committee investigation into the use of performance-enhancing
drugs by professional athletes); see also United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 388 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (holding that there is no exception to prosecution under § 1001, even when the
legislative proceeding lacks “formal trappings” such as oaths and verbatim transcripts).
84 Note, however, that a false statement must be “material” for the government to suc-
ceed in a prosecution under § 1001. See, e.g., United States v. Ballistrea, 101 F.3d 827,
834–35 (2d Cir. 1996).
85 See supra Part I.B.2; see also Comment, Contempt of Congress and “Pertinency”: A
Standard of Culpability, 11 STAN. L. REV. 164, 170–71 (1958).
86 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012).
87 See Brief for the United States in Opposition at 11 n.3, Natale v. United States, No.
13-744 (Mar. 14, 2014).  The majority view, adopted by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits, is that the government must only prove that the defendant deliberately
made statements with knowledge that they were false. See United States v. Tatoyan, 474 F.3d
1174, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gonsalves, 435 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 2006);
United States v. Daughtry, 48 F.3d 829, 831–32 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds,
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ment of Justice maintained that the government need only prove that a
defendant had knowledge of the falseness of his statements.88  In a series
of recent briefs in opposition to certiorari, however, the Solicitor General
announced that “it is now the view of the United States that the ‘will-
fully’ element of [Section] 1001 . . . requires proof that the defendant
made a false statement with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.”89
This shift in the government’s position may have little effect on the pros-
ecution of deliberate falsity in congressional investigations so long as
investigators communicate to interview subjects that deliberate lying is
illegal—and in the authors’ experience, seasoned investigators do just
that.  But such a change in interviewing practices will at least make con-
gressional investigations and Section 1001 less of a trap for the unwary.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1505
Another key criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1505, is available to the
Executive Branch for punishing non-compliance with congressional in-
vestigations.  Prohibiting the “obstruction of proceedings before . . .
committees,” Section 1505 applies whenever a defendant “corruptly” at-
tempts to influence, obstruct, or impede a “due and proper” congres-
sional investigation of which he is aware.90  Any response that
“affirmatively [misleads] and obstruct[s] Congressional inquir[ies]”91
516 U.S. 984 (1995), reinstated in relevant part, 91 F.3d 675 (4th Cir 1996); United States v.
Hildebrandt, 961 F.2d 116, 118 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 878 (1992); United
States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1990); Walker v. United States, 192 F.2d 47,
49–50 (10th Cir. 1951).  The Third Circuit, by contrast, requires proof that the defendant had
“knowledge of the general unlawfulness of the conduct at issue,” United States v. Starnes, 583
F.3d 196, 211–12 (3d Cir. 2009), and the Second Circuit seems to have taken the same posi-
tion.  See United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 541 U.S.
1004 (2004); United States v. Bakhtiari, 913 F.2d 1053, 1060 n.1 (1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 924 (1991); see also United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kava-
naugh, J., concurring) (same).
88 See Nick Krawitz & Margaret Netisham, False Statements and False Claims, 50 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 953, 961–62 (2013).
89 Brief for the United States in Opposition at 12, Natale v. United States, No. 13-744
(Mar. 14, 2014); see also Brief for the United States in Opposition at 11–15, Ajoku v. United
States, 134 S. Ct. 1872 (2014) (No. 13-7264); Brief for the United States in Opposition at
7–11, Russell v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1872 (2014) (No. 13-7357).
90 18 U.S.C. § 1505.  The statute specifically provides, in part:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communi-
cation influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or im-
pede the due and proper . . . exercise of the power of inquiry under which any
inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either
House or any joint committee of the Congress—Shall be fined under this title, im-
prisoned not more than 5 years . . . or both.
See also United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 174 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Price,
951 F.2d 1028, 1031 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Sutton, 732 F.2d 1483, 1490 (10th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 536–37 (9th Cir. 1988)); United States v.
Perraud, 672 F. Supp. 2d 1328, 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
91 United States v. North, 708 F. Supp. 385, 386 n.3 (D.D.C. 1988).
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therefore potentially violates the statute, even if the information was not
provided pursuant to a subpoena.92  Indeed, attempts to influence or ob-
struct congressional investigations are punishable under Section 1505
“even when they occur prior to formal committee authorization.”93
Like the limitation on the application of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to inves-
tigations “conducted pursuant to the authority”94 of Congress, the “due
and proper” language of Section 1505 limits its application to actions
affecting the “legitimate exercise of investigative authority by a congres-
sional committee in an area within the committee’s purview.”95  Such
exercises include those that have not received formal committee authori-
zation, but they do not include independent inquiries by individual mem-
bers or staff.96  Another limitation on the application of Section 1505 is
the requirement that interfering or obstructing action be taken “cor-
ruptly.”  “As used in Section 1505, the term ‘corruptly’ means acting
with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another, includ-
ing making a false or misleading statement, or withholding, concealing,
altering, or destroying a document or other information.”97  Even with
these limitations, however, Section 1505 encompasses a broad swath of
conduct affecting everything from formal hearings to “preliminary and
informal inquiries.”98
92 See id.; United States v. Presser, 292 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1961), aff’d, 371 U.S. 71
(1962) (“[T]he existence of a valid subpoena is not vital to the charge of obstruction of
justice.”).
93 United States v. Mitchell, 877 F.2d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 1989).
94 18 U.S.C. § 1001(c)(2).
95 Mitchell, 877 F.2d at 300.
96 See id.  Although it is an open question whether 18 U.S.C. § 1505 could apply to an
individual member’s investigation, the text of the statute strongly suggests it does not.  18
U.S.C. § 1505 (criminalizing “the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which
any inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or
any joint committee of the Congress”); see also United States v. Rainey, 757 F.3d 234, 241–47
(5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1175 (2015) (suggesting the same).  Note also that in
2014, the Fifth Circuit “interpret[ed] the statutory class of ‘any committee of either
House[ ]’ . . . to include congressional subcommittees.” Rainey, 757 F.3d at 236.
97 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b); see also Mitchell, 877 F.2d at 299 (quoting United States v.
Griffin, 589 F.2d 200, 206–07 (5th Cir. 1979)) (broadly interpreting “corruptly” to encompass
a “variety of corrupt methods . . . limited only by the imagination of the criminally inclined”);
United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 536–37 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that defendant
acted corruptly where he acted “with the purpose of obstructing justice”).
98 See United States v. Cisneros, 26 F. Supp. 2d 24, 39 (D.D.C. 1998) (quoting United
States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 21 (D.D.C. 1989)); United States v. Fruchtman, 421
F.2d 1019, 1021 (6th Cir. 1980) (“‘[P]roceeding’ is a term of broad scope, encompassing both
the investigative and adjudicative functions of a department or agency.”).  For example appli-
cations of § 1505, see United States v. Browning, 630 F.2d 694, 700–01 (10th Cir. 1980)
(encouraging a business partner to give misleading answers to questions from the U.S. Cus-
toms Service); Fruchtman, 421 F.2d at 1021 (altering invoices after learning of an FTC inves-
tigation); United States v. Sprecher, 783 F. Supp. 133, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (making false
statements to the Securities and Exchange Commission during an SEC investigation).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-2\CJP204.txt unknown Seq: 20 20-APR-16 12:08
472 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25:453
Conduct that violates Section 1505 need not be otherwise illegal so
long as it is done with “the requisite corrupt intent to improperly influ-
ence the investigation”; in other words, “the means [a] defendant em-
ploy[s] in bringing to bear his influence” are inconsequential.99  “Even a
literally true statement may not be a complete defense to obstruction”
under Section 1505.100
3. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512 and 1519
The Executive Branch may also seek to enforce compliance with
congressional proceedings through statutes prohibiting the obstruction of
justice by deception under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), or by destruction of evi-
dence under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c) and 1519.
A violation of Section 1512(b) occurs when a person knowingly
engages in misleading or corrupt persuasion with the intent to prevent
testimony or physical evidence from being truthfully presented at a con-
gressional proceeding.101  Courts have determined that the statute does
not require specific intent to mislead or deceive Congress; rather, the
intent element is satisfied if the false or misleading information is merely
likely to be transferred to Congress.102
Relatedly, a violation of Section 1512(c) occurs when a person
“corruptly alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or
other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s
integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or otherwise
obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to
do so.”103  An “official proceeding” includes “a proceeding before Con-
gress,” defined broadly to allow punishment of nearly any intentional
destruction of evidence related to a trial or hearing.104
Destruction of evidence also is punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
Known as the post-Enron “anti-shredding” provision, Section 1519 was
enacted as part of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to broaden the scope of activi-
99 Mitchell, 877 F.2d at 299.  The Mitchell court went on to clarify, “any endeavor, in-
cluding the promised exploitation of a special relationship with the chair of [an] investigating
committee, when done with the requisite intent to corruptly influence a congressional investi-
gation, violates § 1505.” Id.
100 United States v. Safavian, 528 F.3d 957, 968 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
101 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b); see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34304,
OBSTRUCTION OF CONGRESS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL LAW RELATING TO INTERFER-
ENCE WITH CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITIES 40 (2010).
102 United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233, 1251–52 (11th Cir. 1998) (for a violation of
§ 1512(b), the “possibility or likelihood that . . . false or misleading information” would be
transferred to federal authorities is all that is required to satisfy the statute’s intent element)
(emphasis in original); see, e.g., United States v. Carson, 560 F.3d 566, 580–81 (6th Cir.
2009).
103 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c).
104 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1); see also DOYLE, supra note 101, at 9–14, 1 n.5, 9 n.56. R
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ties that had been previously outlawed by § 1512(c).105  In particular, the
statute outlaws the obstruction of “investigations” by destruction of evi-
dence.106  There is some question whether the statute applies to congres-
sional investigations,107 but the legislative history suggests that it
does.108
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621 and 1622
Additional provisions available to enforce congressional investiga-
tions are the statutes that criminalize perjury and subornation of perjury,
18 U.S.C. §§ 1621 and 1622, respectively.  Section 1621 penalizes indi-
viduals who willfully give false testimony under oath on a material mat-
ter.109  Courts have not precisely defined the “willful” requirement of the
statute, but the Supreme Court has indicated that it means “deliber-
ate.”110  An important limitation on the application of Section 1621 is the
“two witness” rule,111 which provides that the uncorroborated testimony
of a single witness is not sufficient to sustain a federal perjury charge.112
105 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 802 (2002); see also
Albert D. Spalding, Jr. & Mary Ashby Morrison, Criminal Liability for Document Shredding
After Arthur Andersen LLP, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 647, 650–51 (2006).
106 See DOYLE, supra note 101, at 13.  The text of the statute provides that anyone who R
knowingly “alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in
any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the
investigation . . . of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the
United States,” can be punished by fine or imprisonment.  18 U.S.C. § 1519.
107 The language, “any department or agency of the United States,” is nearly identical to
the original language in 18 U.S.C. § 1001 that Congress was forced to amend in 1996 to
clarify its application to congressional proceedings. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
As a result, some commenters have suggested that Congress’s use of the language in its 2002
adoption of § 1519—four years after its amendment of § 1001—may indicate that Congress
was seeking to limit the statute’s application to Executive Branch investigations. See Spalding
& Morrison, supra note 105, at 650–51; see also DOYLE, supra note 101, at 40–41. R
108 The Senate report accompanying § 1519 states that it is “meant to do away with the
distinctions . . . between court proceedings, investigations, regulatory or administrative pro-
ceedings . . . and less formal government inquiries, regardless of their title.  Destroying or
falsifying documents to obstruct any of these types of matters or investigations, which . . . are
within the jurisdiction of any federal agency are covered by this statute.” S. REP. NO. 107-146,
at 15 (2002).
109 See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993); United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d
640, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL7-5700,
INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF
CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY 12–13 (1995).
110 See United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937) (“Deliberate material falsifica-
tion under oath constitutes the crime of perjury . . . .”); see also DOYLE, supra note 101, at 46. R
111 See United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 315 (2d Cir. 2006); Stein v. United States,
337 F.2d 14, 18 (9th Cir. 1964).
112 See Weiler v. United States, 323 U.S. 606, 609–10 (1945).  To meet the requirements
of the two witness rule, corroborative evidence must “(1) . . . if true, substantiate[ ] the testi-
mony of a single witness who has sworn to the falsity of the alleged perjurious statement;
[and] (2) . . . the corroborative evidence [must be] trustworthy.” Id.; see also Stewart, 433
F.3d at 316 (quoting Weiler, 323 U.S. at 610).
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By contrast, Section 1622 criminalizes the subornation of perjury
and is not subject to the “two witness” rule.113  Subornation of perjury
occurs when an individual “procures another to commit perjury.”114
5. 18 U.S.C. § 371
The last criminal provision frequently used by the Executive Branch
to punish non-compliance with congressional investigations is the gen-
eral conspiracy statute codified at 18 U.S.C. § 371.  Section 371 applies
when “two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency
thereof in any manner or for any purpose,” and at least one of these
individuals does “any act to effect the object of the conspiracy.”115  The
fraud covered by § 371 includes “impairing, obstructing or defeating the
lawful function of any department of government,” which courts have
read as encompassing congressional investigations.116
B. Executive Branch Enforcement Proceedings
Efforts by the Executive Branch to enforce congressional investiga-
tions using the above-described laws have evolved significantly.  Until
1980, the Executive Branch primarily concerned itself with congres-
sional investigations in one area: the prosecution of those who stood in
contempt of inquiries by the House Un-American Activities Committee
or the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations into communist
activities.117  The only other notable convictions related to congressional
proceedings involved instances of congressmen submitting false payroll
reports and certain labor officers’ obstruction of congressional investiga-
tions.118  After 1980, the Executive Branch stepped up its activity, but it
113 Stein, 337 F.2d at 20; see also Catrino v. United States, 176 F.2d 884, 888 (9th Cir.
1949).
114 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (2012).
115 18 U.S.C. § 371.
116 United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Tanner v. United
States, 483 U.S. 107, 128 (1987)); see also United States v. Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13, 18
(D.D.C. 1989) (“[T]he Court concludes that Count One charges but a single conspiracy to
defeat congressional inquiries into the defendants’ Iran-contra activities by a variety of means,
as necessary to conceal the conspirators’ activities, and that this is a permissible and not mul-
tiplicious method of charging a conspiracy.”).
117 A number of commentators have noted that the FBI and its director J. Edgar Hoover
coordinated activities and congressional hearings into suspected communist activities with the
House Un-American Activities Committee. See Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in
Constitutional Decision-Making, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 115, 130–32 (2005); Frank Wilkinson,
Revisiting the “McCarthy Era”: Looking at Wilkinson v. United States in Light of Wilkinson
v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 681, 684–88 (2000).
118 See, e.g., United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955) (affirming conviction of
Representative Ernest Bramblett for lying about his misuse of official funds); United States v.
Diggs, 613 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980) (affirming conviction
and sentence of Representative Charles Diggs, Jr. for falsifying records to disclose his misuse
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still directed most of its efforts toward the prosecution of government
officials who had misled Congress.  For example, there were prosecu-
tions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1505, and 1621 of various individuals for
lying to Congress about the Iran-Contra Affair119 and of Assistant EPA
Director Rita Lavelle for submitting false documents and testimony to
Congress about improper Superfund payments.120  In each of these cases,
the Executive Branch pursued convictions despite no parallel congres-
sional contempt proceedings.
In contrast to this measured enforcement history, the Executive
Branch has recently initiated a much broader array of prosecutions to
punish non-compliance with congressional investigations.  More than
ever, these prosecutions target private individuals and corporations, and
the Executive Branch regularly pursues them without congressional di-
rection or active support.  In addition, the Executive’s aims seem not
merely limited to encouraging compliance with congressional demands,
but also appear designed to compel the production of information that the
Executive wants for its own investigations.
1. Executive Branch Actions Punishing Obstruction of
Congressional Investigations
One prominent example of the recent enforcement trend is the pros-
ecution of baseball star Roger Clemens.  Clemens voluntarily testified
under oath at a hearing and in depositions held by the House Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform to investigate the usage of per-
formance-enhancing drugs in professional baseball.121  Committee
Chairman Henry Waxman and Ranking Member Tom Davis later ac-
of official funds); Stein v. United States, 337 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1964) (affirming conviction of
Teamsters affiliate for subornation of perjury in Senate committee investigation); United
States v. Presser, 292 F.2d 171 (6th Cir. 1961), aff’d, 371 U.S. 71 (1962) (affirming conviction
for obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 for destroying evidence related to Jimmy
Hoffa sought by congressional subpoena).
119 See, e.g., Indictment at *6, United States v. Weinberger, 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16537
(D.D.C. Oct. 30, 1992) (No. 92-416) (indicting Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger for
violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1505, and 1001 for falsely denying knowledge of the Iran-
Contra Affair); Poindexter, 725 F. Supp. 13 (reviewing reversed conviction of National Secur-
ity Advisor John Poindexter under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1505, and 1001); United States v.
North, 910 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1990), withdrawn and superseded in part, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (per curium) (reviewing convictions of Oliver North, National Security Council
advisor, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1505, and 1001).  Of course, these proceedings represented
a bit of an anomaly in that as a technical matter, the Executive power was being exercised by
the Independent Counsel—not the Administration. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 1031
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (Silberman, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
120 See United States v. Lavelle, 751 F.2d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1985), abrogated by Huddle-
ston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
121 See Memorandum from Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on Oversight &
Gov’t Reform, to Democratic Members of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform (Feb.
27, 2008) (on file with the H. Comm. on Oversight & Gov’t Reform).
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cused Clemens of lying during his testimony.122  Rather than attempting
to cite him for contempt of Congress, however, Chairman Waxman and
Representative Davis simply referred Clemens for prosecution by the
Department of Justice.123  Following this referral, the Department of Jus-
tice charged Clemens under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1505, and 1621 for al-
legedly making “false and misleading” sworn statements to Congress.124
Clemens fought these charges and prevailed—eventually being cleared
of all wrongdoing.125  But throughout his prosecution, Clemens was
forced to respond both to the legal arguments of prosecutors and to the
commentary of congressmen, who were able to criticize Clemens without
shouldering the burdens or political risk associated with contempt
proceedings.
Another example of the changing role of the Justice Department in
examining congressional and company interactions is the recent prosecu-
tion of BP PLC related to a letter concerning the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill.  Congressman Edward Markey wrote a letter to the company and
asked it to voluntarily provide information regarding the amount of oil
leaking from the Deepwater Horizon rig.126  BP provided a letter con-
taining a leakage estimate.127  Congressman Markey did not seek to initi-
ate any further action—whether by subpoena or use of contempt
power—relating to the letter.  In the course of its own investigation into
the Deepwater Horizon accident, however, the Department of Justice be-
came aware of leakage estimates higher than those submitted to Con-
gressman Markey.  The Justice Department used this information as the
basis of criminal charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1505, alleging that a BP
executive had obstructed Congress.128  Indeed, the Department made
these charges a focal point of its prosecutorial scheme.129  BP ultimately
122 See id. at 1.
123 See id.
124 Indictment at 12–14, United States v. Clemens, No. 10-CR-223 (D.D.C. May 15,
2009).
125 See Del Quentin Wilber & Ann E. Marimow, Roger Clemens Acquitted of All
Charges, WASH. POST (June 18, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/roger-
clemens-trial-verdict-reached/2012/06/18/gJQAQxvzlV_story.html.
126 See United States v. Rainey, 946 F. Supp. 2d 518, 522, 524–25, 531–32 (E.D. La.
2013), vacated and remanded, 757 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1175
(2015).
127 See id. at 522.
128 Information for Seaman’s Manslaughter, Clean Water Act, Migratory Bird Treaty Act
and Obstruction of Congress at 24, United States v. BP Exploration & Prod., Inc., No. 2:12-
CR-292 (E.D. La. Nov. 15, 2012), ECF No. 1; see also Indictment at 8–11, United States v.
Rainey, No. 2:12-CR-291 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 2012), ECF No. 1.
129 BP Exploration and Production Inc. Agrees to Plead Guilty to Felony Manslaughter,
Environmental Crimes and Obstruction of Congress Surrounding Deepwater Horizon Inci-
dent, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bp-exploration-
and-production-inc-agrees-plead-guilty-felony-manslaughter-environmental; Lanny A. Breuer,
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reached a plea agreement with the government.130  The BP executive al-
leged to have obstructed Congress was tried and acquitted.131
Relatedly, highly visible congressional hearings into Toyota’s re-
sponse to sudden-acceleration “sticky pedal” issues laid the groundwork
for subsequent Executive action.  In 2010, Toyota produced more than
75,000 documents to the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform in re-
sponse to information requests.132  Toyota’s senior executives also testi-
fied at numerous hearings.133  Around the same time, the Department of
Deputy Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Speech at the BP Press Conference (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crm-speech-121115.html.
130 See BP Exploration and Production Inc. Pleads Guilty, Is Sentenced to Pay Record $4
Billion for Crimes Surrounding Deepwater Horizon Incident, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 29,
2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/January/13-ag-123.html.
131 See Order, United States v. Rainey, No. 12-cr-291 (E.D. La. June 5, 2015), ECF No.
504.  The acquitted BP executive, David Rainey, had submitted BP’s leakage estimate.  The
Department of Justice charged Rainey with one count of obstructing Congress under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1505 and one count of making false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. See Second Super-
seding Indictment, United States v. Rainey, No. 12-cr-291 (E.D. La. Sept. 19, 2014), ECF No.
179.  In preparing his defense, Rainey served subpoenas seeking congressional documents and
the testimony of three members of Congress and six congressional staffers. See Order Author-
izing Subpoenas, United States v. Rainey, No. 12-cr-291 (E.D. La. Dec. 11, 2014), ECF No.
264.  Through the U.S. House of Representative’s Office of General Counsel, the subpoena
recipients moved to quash the subpoenas under the Constitution’s Speech or Debate clause.
See Motion To Quash, United States v. Rainey, No. 12-cr-291 (E.D. La. May 8, 2015), ECF
No. 419.  The General Counsel’s Office explained that the subpoena recipients had made vol-
untary document productions to Rainey and would voluntarily testify as prosecution witnesses,
but it argued that the Speech or Debate Clause’s privilege against compelled testimony and
document production was “absolute.” Id. at 16; see also id. at 8–17.  The trial court agreed
with the House General Counsel’s Office that the privilege was absolute, but disagreed that the
subpoena recipients’ voluntary productions and testimony were sufficient to accommodate
Rainey’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.  Thus, the court simultaneously granted the mo-
tion to quash and dismissed the obstruction of Congress charge. See Order, United States v.
Rainey, No. 12-cr-291 (E.D. La. June 1, 2015), ECF No. 494.  A jury then acquitted Rainey of
making false statements. See Order, United States v. Rainey, No. 12-cr-291 (E.D. La. June 5,
2015), ECF No. 504.  Notably, the speech or debate privilege issues that arose in Rainey would
not have arisen in a congressional contempt proceeding.  They also likely would not have
arisen in the context of an Executive Branch prosecution on a criminal referral from Congress.
When Congress initiates the prosecution with a referral, they presumably do so with the under-
standing that speech or debate will be waived to ensure the prosecution can go forward. See S.
Res. 66, 106th Cong. (1999).
132 David Ingram, Toyota Executives Head to Capitol Hill to Testify on Public Safety
Record; Toyota Executives to Testify on Public Safety Record, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 23, 2010.
133 See, e.g., Response by Toyota and NHTSA to Incidents of Sudden Unintended Acceler-
ation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on
Energy & Commerce, 111th Cong. 86–134 (2010) (testimony of James E Lentz, President &
Chief Operating Officer, Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.); Toyota Gas Pedals: Is the Public
At Risk?: H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. (2010) (testimony of Akio
Toyoda, President & Chief Executive Officer, Toyota Motor Corporation, and Yoshimi Inaba,
President & Chief Executive Officer, Toyota Motor North America, Inc.); Update on Toyota
and NHTSA’s Response to the Problem of Sudden Unintended Acceleration: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
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Justice convened a grand jury to probe the sudden-acceleration issue.134
The Justice Department entered into negotiations with Toyota, and in
March 2014, Toyota accepted a deferred-prosecution agreement, in
which the company consented to the filing of a criminal information
charging Toyota with a single count of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1343 and agreed to pay a financial penalty of $1.2 billion.135
The Executive Branch’s increased role in enforcing congressional
investigations is also apparent in other matters.  For instance, by 2011,
the Department of Justice had convicted or negotiated guilty pleas for
three individuals under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 1505 for voluntarily of-
fering false or misleading testimony during an investigation by the Sen-
ate Committee on Indian Affairs into improper interactions between
lobbyists and staff of the General Services Administration.136  The Com-
mittee deferred entirely to the Executive with respect to these prosecu-
tions, taking no separate action to hold the individuals in contempt of
Congress.137  Similarly, Congress deferred to the Executive Branch to
punish individuals who allegedly lied to or obstructed the Senate Perma-
nent Subcommittee on Investigations (PSI) or the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee in matters related to the Enron scandal,138 health-care
operations,139 and an investigation into illegal federal campaign contribu-
111th Cong. 52–73 (2010) (testimony of James E. Lentz, President & Chief Operating Officer,
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.).
134 See Peter J. Henning, Toyota’s Latest Legal Headache: Federal Subpoenas, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 23, 2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/02/23/toyotas-growing-legal-
problems.
135 See generally Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1, United States v. Toyota Motor
Corp., 2014 WL 1043909 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2014); see id. Statement of Facts at 12, Toyota
Motor Corp., 2014 WL 1043909.
136 See United States v. Safavian, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 649 F.3d 688
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (affirming denial of defendant’s motions opposing conviction under 18
U.S.C. § 1001 for lying to the Committee on Indian Affairs); Plea Agreement at 1, 7, United
States v. Federici, No. 07-145 (D.D.C. June 6, 2007) (entering guilty plea under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1505 for obstructing Congress); Plea Agreement, United States v. Griles, No. 07-79 (D.D.C.
Mar. 23, 2007) (same).
137 Senator John McCain, who served as chairman of the committee, threatened to hold
Italia Federici, President of the Council of Republicans for Environmental Advocacy, in con-
tempt during a hearing at which she refused to answer questions and was generally combative,
but he never sought a committee vote to enforce his threat. See Tribal Lobbying Matters:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 109th Cong. 9 (2005).
138 See United States v. Boyle, No. 4:03-CR-363 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (convicting defendant
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1001 for making a false statement and conspiring to falsify
records during interview with Senate PSI staff).
139 See, e.g., United States v. Weissman, 22 F. Supp. 2d 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 195
F.3d 96 (2d Cir. 1999) (convicting an individual of obstructing Congress under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1505 for personally altering documents produced in response to a subcommittee subpoena,
and for causing another not to produce certain unaltered documents).
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tions.140  In each of these matters, the Executive Branch was left to give
force to Congress’s investigative demands.141
2. Executive Branch Use of Congressional Investigation
Findings
As the Executive Branch has become more involved in enforcing
congressional investigations, it also has begun to more regularly use the
findings of those investigations for its own initiatives.  In fact, it is not
uncommon for individuals and corporations to be investigated by Con-
gress and then prosecuted or sued by federal or state enforcement
agencies.
In 2012, for example, the Department of Justice used the findings of
a report by the Senate PSI as the basis to further its own investigation
into HSBC Bank.142  That investigation, which largely adopted PSI’s
conclusions, alleged instances of money laundering and sanctions viola-
tions and eventually resulted in a deferred prosecution agreement under
which the bank forfeited more than $1.2 billion to the government.143  A
140 See generally United States v. Trie, 21 F. Supp. 2d 7, 14 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting
charges under, among other statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1505 for “instruct[ing] a witness to
alter, destroy or conceal documents responsive to a subpoena” issued in the course of a Senate
committee’s investigation); Indictment, United States v. Trie, 21 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 1998),
http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1998/02/05/trie.indictment; see also DOYLE, supra note
101, at 16–18. R
141 Of course, not all referrals lead to prosecution.  For example, Chairman Carl Levin of
the Senate PSI recommended that the Department of Justice investigate certain financial insti-
tutions for obstruction under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 on the basis that they misled Congress.  But the
Department found insufficient evidence to prosecute. See Jason Ryan, DOJ Will Not Prose-
cute Goldman Sachs in Financial Crisis Probe, ABC NEWS (Aug. 9, 2012), http://abcnews.go
.com/blogs/politics/2012/08/doj-will-not-prosecute-goldman-sachs-in-financial-crisis-probe.
Likewise, following revelations regarding Martha Stewart’s insider trading, the House Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce requested that the DOJ investigate and prosecute her under
18 U.S.C. § 1001 for allegedly submitting false information to the Committee, but the DOJ
opted not to act. See Letter from W.J. Tauzin et al., Chairman, H. Comm. on Energy &
Commerce, to John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Sept. 10, 2002), http://
fl1.findlaw.com/news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/mstewart/encmrc91002dojltr.pdf.
142 See Kevin McCoy, HSBC Will Pay $1.9 Billion for Money Laundering, USA TODAY
(Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2012/12/11/hsbc-laundering-
probe/1760351 (stating that the facts that emerged as a result of the DOJ settlement “echoed
findings of a July report by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations”); Ben
Protess and Jessica Silver-Greenberg, HSBC to Pay $1.92 Billion to Settle Charges of Money
Laundering, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/hsbc-said-
to-near-1-9-billion-settlement-over-money-laundering (“HSBC was thrust into the spotlight in
July after a Congressional committee outlined how the bank, between 2001 and 2010, ‘ex-
posed the U.S. financial system to money laundering and terrorist financing risks.’  The Per-
manent Subcommittee on Investigations held a subsequent hearing at which the bank’s
compliance chief resigned amid mounting concerns that senior bank officials were complicit in
the illegal activity.”).
143 See HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A. Admit to Anti-Money Laundering
and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 Billion in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S.
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similar scenario unfolded with the telephone company Inc21.  Following
an investigation by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, the company was identified in a Majority staff report as
having engaged in questionable billing practices.144  The Department of
Justice subsequently brought criminal charges and secured guilty pleas
against two of the company’s senior executives for illegal billing
schemes.145  The Executive Branch also followed an almost year-long
investigation by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce into the
federal loans requested and received by Solyndra, a clean energy com-
pany,146 with its own investigation into the company for possible fraud
violations.147  And, more recently, federal agencies and state executive
agencies have pursued investigations and enforcement actions against va-
rious for-profit colleges and universities using findings from an investi-
gation into for-profit schools by the Majority staff of the Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP).148
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crm-
1478.html.
144 See generally MAJORITY STAFF OF THE OFFICE OF OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, S.
COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE & TRANSPORTATION, 111TH CONG., UNAUTHORIZED CHARGES
ON TELEPHONE BILLS 4–5 (Comm. Print 2011).
145 See San Francisco Brothers Plead Guilty to Charges Stemming from Fraudulent Bill-
ing Scheme, US. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, N.D. CAL. (Dec. 12, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/
archive/usao/can/news/2012/2012_12_12_lins.guiltyplea.press.html.
146 MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON ENERGY & COMMERCE, 112TH CONG., THE SOLYN-
DRA FAILURE 6, 8 (Comm. Print 2012).
147 See, e.g., Seth Stern & Jim Snyder, FBI Said to Be Probing Solyndra for Possible
Account Fraud, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 29, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-09-29/
fbi-said-to-be-probing-solyndra-for-possible-accounting-fraud.html; Jim McElhatton, Grand
Jury Begins Probe of Solyndra, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes
.com/news/2011/dec/13/grand-jury-begins-probe-of-bankrupt-solyndra.  Another prominent
example of an Executive Branch prosecution building on a congressional investigation is the
conviction of Jeffrey Skilling, who was investigated in depth by two congressional commit-
tees, for crimes associated with the Enron scandal. See Hamilton, Congressional Investiga-
tions, supra note 2, at 1172.  Also, the Food and Drug Administration commenced a criminal R
investigation against a Massachusetts company after an investigation by the House Committee
on Energy and Commerce determined that the company may have caused a meningitis out-
break. See Feds Open Criminal Inquiry into Firm Linked to Deadly Meningitis Outbreak,
CNN (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/23/health/massachusetts-outbreak-crimi-
nal-investigation; The Fungal Meningitis Outbreak: Could It Have Been Prevented?  Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com-
merce, 112th Cong. (2012).
148 See generally Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-
00292-SEB-TAB, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28254 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2015); Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 1:14-cv-07194 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 2014); United States
v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-0867-TWP-MJD, 2012 WL 266943 (S.D. Ind. 2012);
Commonwealth v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., No. 14-1093 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014); MA-
JORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUCATION, LABOR AND PENSIONS, 112TH CONG.,
FOR PROFIT HIGHER EDUCATION: THE FAILURE TO SAFEGUARD THE FEDERAL INVESTMENT AND
ENSURE STUDENT SUCCESS (Comm. Print 2012).
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The Executive Branch also regularly uses congressional findings to
advance civil suits.149  In one action, the Justice Department joined a
False Claims Act suit against a large government contractor after a series
of investigations—including House and Senate committee investiga-
tions—revealed that the contractor may have failed to complete security
background checks before seeking payment from the government.150
In all of these actions, the Executive Branch was able to gather a
significant portion of relevant evidence without ever issuing a warrant or
subpoena.  Relying on documents and testimony offered to Congress—
often in an entirely different atmosphere and under an entirely different
set of rules than would apply to its own investigative proceedings151—
the Executive Branch was able to build cases that it might otherwise
have not pursued.
As discussed below, the result of increased Executive Branch in-
volvement in enforcing congressional investigations is that individuals
and corporations subject to congressional investigation must now weigh,
and react to the possibility of a related Executive Branch investigation.
The current environment also warrants consideration from a constitu-
tional perspective, with special attention given to how the Executive
Branch’s recent actions may be affecting the balance of power between
the governmental branches.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF INCREASED EXECUTIVE BRANCH
ENFORCEMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
The increasing willingness of the Executive Branch to prosecute ac-
tivity that Congress could—but is unlikely to—punish under its con-
tempt powers, coupled with a rise in Executive Branch investigations
that parallel or build on congressional inquiries represents a significant
development in the practice and effect of congressional investigations.
This development manifests itself in three related arenas.
First, from a constitutional perspective, the increased involvement
of the Executive Branch in the enforcement of congressional investiga-
tions harkens a shift of power to the Executive Branch.  If Congress be-
comes accustomed to relying on the Executive Branch to enforce
149 See, e.g., Hamilton, Congressional Investigations, supra note 2, at 1171.  In addition R
to Executive Branch proceedings, plaintiffs’ lawyers have been known to initiate civil suits or
administrative proceedings based on a congressional investigation, hearing, or both. Id. at
1171–72.
150 See Tom Hamburger & Debbi Wilgoren, Justice Department Says USIS Submitted
665,000 Incomplete Background Checks, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-department-joins-lawsuit-against-usis-over-
background-checks/2014/01/23/db16e244-8432-11e3-8099-9181471f7aaf_story.html.
151 See Bopp & Lay, The Availability of Common Law Privileges, supra note 5, at R
905–06; infra Part III.B.
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compliance with its investigative demands, Congress may compromise
its ability to effectively gather information.  This is particularly true with
respect to issues on which congressional and executive interests diverge.
The more reliant Congress is on Executive Branch enforcement of its
investigative prerogatives, the more likely it is that the Executive will
prevail when inter-branch conflicts arise regarding congressional infor-
mation requests.
Second, the entire point of separation of powers—at its core—is to
protect individual liberty.152  When the Executive usurps congressional
investigative power, the affront to the separation of powers necessarily
will affect the liberty of individuals against government intrusion.  Under
our constitutional structure, the Executive is limited in gathering infor-
mation (through safeguards that narrow and restrict the scope and issu-
ance of warrants and subpoenas), but it has a relatively straightforward
unilateral process for prosecuting or suing individuals, which involves
the expenditure of little to no political capital.  By contrast, Congress has
few limits on its information-gathering ability, but it traditionally has
found it difficult to take unilateral action against a non-compliant indi-
vidual or corporation—collective action problems are not conducive to
swift and zealous enforcement of the law.153  And virtually any act by
Congress to enforce its authority requires the expenditure of considerable
political capital.  Thus, by utilizing Congress’s broad information-gather-
ing ability to bolster its prosecutorial and litigation authority, the Execu-
tive may be able to circumvent some of the safeguards designed to
protect individual liberty.
Third, the new enforcement paradigm for congressional investiga-
tions also raises significant concerns for persons targeted by such investi-
gations.  Individuals and corporations must now be especially cognizant
of the risk that any non-disclosure, misstatement, or act of non-compli-
ance could result in prosecution by the Executive Branch—regardless of
Congress’s view on, or interest in, the matter.  Individuals and corpora-
tions also must view congressional investigations as potential precursors
to, or information-gathering initiatives for, investigations of the Execu-
tive.  They must assume that information provided to Congress may
work its way into an Executive Branch investigation.  This is particularly
true given the differing privilege and confidentiality rules that apply in
congressional investigations.  The risk is heightened in high-profile mat-
152 See NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559–60 (2014) (providing case examples
that emphasize the interplay between individual liberty and separation of powers). See gener-
ally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 51 (James Madison).
153 Cf. Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting Congress’s collec-
tive action challenges); THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the unitary
executive and the need for an energetic executive).
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ters or those in which there is—or is likely to be—parallel investigatory
action by the Executive.
A. A Shift of Power from Congress to the Executive Branch
It used to be axiomatic that in disputes with private citizens—and,
more pointedly, in disputes with the Executive Branch—Congress had
substantial power, but used that power sparingly, relying instead on the
in terrorem effects of its power.154  That dynamic seems to have
changed.  Congress now uses its power less frequently, which diminishes
the effects of that power.
1. A Case Study in the Shift of Power
A contrast in cases provides the best example here: witness the
power of Congress in the case of William P. MacCracken, Jr. compared
to Congress’s reliance on the Executive Branch in the recent scandal in-
volving Lois Lerner.
MacCracken.  In the mid-1930s, Senator Hugo Black led a hard-
charging investigation into “all existing contracts entered into by the
Postmaster General for the carriage of air mail and ocean mail.”155  The
investigation targeted William P. MacCracken, Jr., a Washington law-
yer156 who had previously served as Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Aeronautics in the late 1920s.157  On January 31, 1934, Black’s Sen-
ate committee served MacCracken with a subpoena duces tecum, de-
manding that he personally appear before the committee “instanter, at
12:30 p.m.” and produce all documents in his possession relevant to “air-
mail and ocean-mail contracts.”158  The subpoena provided no explana-
tion for the extraordinary return date and made no accommodation for
the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine, despite the fact
that the committee subpoenaed MacCracken precisely because he was
the attorney for Senator Black’s corporate targets.
154 An example of the in terrorem effects of the fear of Congress’s power to compel and
place in contempt is the conflict that occurred between Senator James O. Eastland, Chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the American Bar Association (ABA) over William H.
Rehnquist’s nomination to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Senator Eastland had learned that an ABA committee “was not going to give Rehnquist a
favorable recommendation” for the Court on what Senator Eastland believed were blatant po-
litical grounds. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SU-
PREME COURT 195 (2005).  Senator Eastland informed the ABA that if they did not give a
favorable rating to Rehnquist, he would subpoena every member of the committee and compel
them to justify their vote under oath. Id.  The ABA committee voted to find Rehnquist highly
qualified. Id.
155 Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125, 145 (1935).
156 Id. at 135–45.
157 William P. MacCracken Papers, ca. 1920s–1940s, EAST CAROLINA UNIV., http://digi-
tal.lib.ecu.edu/special/ead/findingaids/0811/#histnote (last visited Mar. 9, 2016).
158 MacCracken v. Jurney, 72 F.2d 560, 561 (D.C. Cir. 1934), rev’d, 294 U.S. 125 (1935).
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MacCracken made return as demanded and stated that he was ready
to produce all responsive documents in his possession except for papers
covered by privilege.159  Chairman Black then asked MacCracken if he
would seek waivers from his clients, which MacCracken readily agreed
to do.160  Over the next two days, MacCracken produced documents per-
taining to clients from whom he had received a privilege waiver,161 but
he declined to produce documents from four clients who had not yet
waived their privilege.162  MacCracken admitted in further testimony that
he had allowed a client’s representative to remove some relevant files
from his office,163 and that his partner had allowed another client’s repre-
sentative to remove and attempt to destroy personal records that were
“unrelated to matters under investigation by the Committee.”164
Following MacCracken’s testimony, the committee overruled any
existing claims of privilege, and the full Senate passed a resolution for
the Sergeant-at-Arms “to take MacCracken into custody before the bar of
the Senate.”165  The resolution sought to compel the testimony and pro-
duction of outstanding documents necessary for the committee to per-
form its legislative function.166  MacCracken promptly obtained the final
waivers from his clients “and made available to the committee . . . all
papers in his possession relating to air mail contracts.”167
On February 5, the Senate passed a resolution directing Mac-
Cracken to appear before the Senate and show cause for why he ought
not be held in contempt for “the destruction and removal of certain pa-
pers, files, and memorandums” from his files.168  MacCracken, believing
all relevant documents in his possession had already been turned over to
the committee, and that the committee lacked the constitutional authority
to punish him for his role in the removal and destruction of documents,
refused to appear before the Senate.169  On February 9, upon Mac-
Cracken’s failure to appear, the Senate immediately passed a resolution
directing the Vice President to issue a warrant for MacCracken’s
arrest.170
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Jurney, 294 U.S. at 146.
164 Id.  Postal inspectors reconstructed the papers for the committee. Id. at 147 n.3.
165 Id. at 146–47 & 146 n.2; MacCracken, 72 F.2d at 561.
166 MacCracken, 72 F.2d at 562.
167 Id.
168 Jurney, 294 U.S. at 143–44; MacCracken, 72 F.2d at 563.  The resolution also di-
rected the client representatives to show cause for why they should not also be held in con-
tempt. Jurney, 294 U.S. at 143–44; MacCracken, 72 F.2d at 563.
169 Jurney, 294 U.S. at 143–44; MacCracken, 72 F.2d at 563–64.
170 MacCracken, 72 F.2d at 563.  Time Magazine vividly recounts the Senate’s reaction.
Bar of the Senate, TIME, Feb. 19, 1934 (internal citation omitted).
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MacCracken was subsequently tried before the Senate on February
14 in an inherent contempt proceeding.  Rejecting a proposal to refer a
contempt citation to the Executive Branch pursuant to 2 U.S.C. § 192,
the Senate proceeded to find MacCracken in contempt, sentencing him to
ten days’ imprisonment.171  MacCracken challenged the Senate’s author-
ity to punitively punish him for obstruction, but the Supreme Court up-
held the Senate’s actions as an appropriate invocation of its inherent
contempt power.172
Lois Lerner.  Lois Lerner, a former Director of the IRS Exempt Or-
ganizations (EO) division, was at the center of the IRS targeting scandal
in which the IRS used inappropriate, politically based criteria to target
conservative groups.173  Although the record suggests that Lerner com-
mitted contempts more egregious than those punished in MacCracken’s
case, the House of Representatives, in keeping with the current trend of
deferring enforcement to the Executive Branch, referred the matter to the
Department of Justice.
Specifically, on May 14, 2013, the House Oversight and Govern-
ment Reform Committee (HOGR) Chairman Darrell Issa requested that
Lerner testify at a May 22, 2013 hearing regarding the IRS targeting.174
Determining that Lerner’s testimony was “critical to the Committee’s in-
vestigation,” Issa placed Lerner under subpoena on May 20, 2013.175
That same day, Lerner’s counsel informed HOGR that she would invoke
her Fifth Amendment rights at the hearing and requested to be ex-
cused.176  Chairman Issa denied this request, noting that Lerner might
decide at the hearing to waive her privilege.177
Lerner appeared at the hearing and voluntarily gave an opening
statement that contained specific denials of wrongdoing relative to the
IRS investigation.178  The hearing was recessed to determine whether
this voluntary statement constituted a waiver of Lerner’s Fifth Amend-
ment right not to incriminate herself.179  On June 28, 2013, HOGR met
in business session and after debate approved a resolution finding Lerner
171 78 CONG. REC. 2468, 2495–97 (1934).
172 Jurney, 294 U.S. at 147–52.
173 H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, LOIS LERNER’S INVOLVEMENT IN THE
IRS TARGETING OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 3 (2014). See generally H. COMM. ON
OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, RESOLUTION RECOMMENDING THAT THE HOUSE OF REPRESENT-
ATIVES FIND LOIS G. LERNER, FORMER DIRECTOR, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, INTERNAL REVE-
NUE SERVICE, IN CONTEMPT OF CONGRESS FOR REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH A SUBPOENA DULY
ISSUED BY THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM [hereinafter HOGR
REPORT].
174 HOGR REPORT, supra note 173, at 8. R
175 Id.
176 Id. at 8–9.
177 Id. at 9.
178 Id. at 10–11.
179 Id.
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had waived her Fifth Amendment rights in making a voluntary state-
ment.180  The hearing was reconvened on March 5, 2014.181  Prior to this
hearing, Lerner had retired, and was accordingly before HOGR as a pri-
vate citizen previously employed by the Government—the same position
MacCracken stood in.  In spite of warnings by Chairman Issa that Lerner
could be held in contempt for refusing to answer questions because her
privilege claim had been overruled, Lerner again declined to answer any
questions.182  Subsequent to this hearing, Lerner’s lawyer “convened a
press conference at which he apparently revealed that [Lerner] had sat
for an interview with Department of Justice prosecutors and [Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration] staff within the past six
months.”183  This interview was neither under oath nor under any grant
of immunity.184  These revelations seemed to undermine Lerner’s invo-
cation of the Fifth Amendment.
HOGR sought to hold Lerner in contempt under 2 U.S.C. § 192,
rather than through an inherent contempt proceeding.185  The full House
accordingly held Lerner in contempt on May 7, 2014 by a vote of 231 to
187, and the Speaker certified the contempt citation to the United States
Attorney for the District of Columbia.186
The result of the House referring Lerner—a former administration
official at the epicenter of a scandal involving the administration—to the
Executive Branch for prosecution, rather than exercising its inherent con-
tempt power, was unsurprising: the Executive elected not to pursue con-
tempt or criminal charges against Lerner.187  Thus, because of the
180 Id. at 12.
181 Id. at 13–14.
182 Id. at 13–16.
183 Id. at 16–17.
184 Id. at 17.
185 See id. at 20; see also Russell Berman, Will the House Arrest Lois Lerner?, THE HILL
(May 11, 2014), http://www.thehill.com/homenews/house/205792-boehner-house-wont-arrest-
lerner.
186 H.R. Res. 574, 113th Cong. (2014).
187 See Letter from Ronald Machen, U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, to John
Boehner, U.S. House Speaker (Mar. 31, 2015) (informing Speaker Boehner that the Depart-
ment of Justice would not present Lois Lerner’s contempt citation to a federal grand jury);
Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Assistant Attorney General, to House Judiciary Committee (Oct.
23, 2015) (informing that the Department of Justice would not pursue criminal charges against
Lerner).  Indeed, the Department of Justice foreshadowed this result long before it announced
its decisions.  Responding to HOGR questioning on July 17, 2014, regarding whether 2 U.S.C.
§ 192, which states that it is the U.S. Attorney’s “duty . . . to bring the matter before the grand
jury for its action,” imposes a mandatory duty on the U.S. Attorney to present the citation to
the grand jury, Deputy Attorney General James Cole responded that the mandatory language in
the statute was not so mandatory, noting that the Office of Legal Counsel had opined that there
was discretion on whether to present a House-certified contempt citation to the grand jury.
Hearing Examining the Justice Department’s Response to the IRS Targeting Scandal, H. Sub-
comm. on Economic Growth, Job Creation and Regulatory Affairs of the H. Comm. on Over-
sight and Gov’t Reform, 113th Cong. 42–43 (2014).  The central questions of (1) whether the
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House’s reliance on the Executive to enforce its investigative demands,
Lerner avoided any penalty for her obstructive stance.
2. Separation of Powers Concerns
The increasing role of the Executive Branch in congressional inves-
tigations also presents potential separation of powers concerns.  The
Founders divided the powers of the federal government into three
branches in order to guard against any one branch becoming too power-
ful.188  For Congress to be an effective branch of government, and an
effective check on the other branches, it must be able to acquire informa-
tion and make informed decisions on the subject matter of potential leg-
islation.189  In ceding investigative enforcement authority to the
Executive Branch, Congress relinquishes a measure of control over its
investigations and its ability to gather facts and data.  The Executive
Branch may decide whether to pursue enforcement actions or follow-up
investigations based on its goals, not necessarily Congress’s.190  In addi-
tion, when the Executive Branch’s priorities differ from Congress’s, and
those subpoenaed by Congress do not fear congressional threats of con-
tempt or Executive Branch enforcement, Congress may struggle to obtain
the information it seeks, as it may face less cooperative witnesses.191
statute required the U.S. Attorney to present the citation to the grand jury, and (2) whether
Congress could constitutionally impose such a duty, are open issues that can be argued either
way. Compare Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Executive Branch Official Who
Has Asserted a Claim of Executive Privilege, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 101 (1984), with CONGRESS’S
CONTEMPT POWER, supra note 34, at 21–23 (noting the question is open). See also United R
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 184–85 (5th Cir. 1965) (en banc) (Brown, J., concurring) (holding
that a U.S. Attorney can be compelled to prepare an indictment at the request of the grand
jury); id. at 179 (Rives, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).
188 See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 47, 51 (James Madison).
189 See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504–05 (1975); McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 175 (1927); Hamilton, Congressional Investigations, supra note 2. R
190 See, e.g., Zuckerman, supra note 1, at 43 (comparing MacCracken to recent referrals R
of contempt citations to the Justice Department and arguing that “Congress has become vul-
nerable to the discretion of federal prosecutors”); see also Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch
Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (2009) (arguing “that Congress has
been wrong, since the 1970s, in seeking judicial enforcement of contempt citations against
Executive Branch officials, and that the courts have been wrong in finding such disputes justi-
ciable” in part because “Congress’s abdication of this power aggrandizes the executive and
judicial branches at Congress’s expense, upsetting the proper balance of the separation of
powers”).
191 See Zuckerman, supra note 1, at 64–65.  Furthermore, Justice Scalia’s characterization R
of the majority’s reasoning in the recent NLRB v. Canning case as one relying on an “adverse
possession theory of executive authority” indicates a risk that Congress takes in abdicating
enforcement authority to the Executive Branch.  134 S. Ct. 2550, 2592 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).  In Canning, the majority opinion cites historical practice to resolve textual ambi-
guities about the President’s appointment authority under the Recess Appointments Clause.
See id. at 2556–78.  According to Justice Scalia, the majority “swe[pt] away the key textual
limitations on the recess-appointment power” by invoking a theory that “Presidents have long
claimed the powers in question, and the Senate has not disputed those claims with sufficient
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B. Potential Dangers to Personal Liberties
The Department of Justice and the rest of the Executive Branch are
subject to a number of external restraints on their ability to gather infor-
mation and conduct investigations.  Congress, on the other hand, oper-
ates under a different set of rules, and is more easily able to collect
information from individuals and organizations.  Given the recent trends
in congressional investigations, the targets of such inquiries must be
aware that traditional protections of personal liberties normally available
to them may not apply.
1. Limits on Executive Branch Investigations
By its very nature, the Executive is granted the ability to act swiftly.
But because there is so little restraint on its ability to take action, its
investigative powers are limited by constitutional design.  Take, for ex-
ample, the principal investigative body of the Executive Branch, the De-
partment of Justice.  The most traditional tools used by the Justice
Department in conducting investigations are searches and seizures and
grand jury subpoenas.  They are powerful weapons.  But they are limited
in their scope.
The Fourth Amendment acts as a powerful restraint on the federal
government’s search and seizure powers.  Under normal circumstances,
pre-enforcement review is required before a search and seizure is made:
the Department of Justice must go before a neutral magistrate and
demonstrate—under oath—that they have probable cause to believe that
a federal crime has been, or will be, committed.192  Because of the war-
rant requirement, the Department of Justice usually cannot deploy its
broad power ex ante without the review of an impartial judge.  Even in
cases where a warrant is not required, the Executive Branch must demon-
strate that its search or seizure fell within one of the judicially recognized
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.193  In addi-
tion, if the government conducts a search or seizure improperly, it may
vigor, so the Court should not ‘upset the compromises and working arrangements that the
elected branches of Government themselves have reached.’” Id. at 2592.  Given the greater
ease with which the President may establish historical precedent in areas presenting separation
of powers issues, according to Scalia, the “majority’s methodology thus all but guarantees the
continuing aggrandizement of the Executive Branch.” Id. at 2606.  Congress thus should be
wary of the historical precedents that are being established with the growing role of the Execu-
tive Branch in congressional investigations, as such precedents could be used to further justify
an expansion of executive power.
192 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014)
(noting that “a [judicial] warrant ensures that the inferences to support a search are ‘drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.’” (citation omitted)); United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 913–15 (1984).
193 See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
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not be able to use the evidence gathered at trial under the application of
the Exclusionary Rule.194
The Department of Justice also enjoys significant investigative
power through its ability to obtain grand jury subpoenas.  But this power
is limited because of the grand jury’s structure and the right to challenge
the validity of a grand jury subpoena duces tecum before it is
enforced.195
Administrative subpoenas also are limited.  While an agency can
“investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even
just because it wants assurance that it is not,”196 its investigative power is
cabined to avoid abusive investigations.  Courts, for instance, will en-
force an administrative subpoena only “if: (1) the subpoena is within the
statutory authority of the agency; (2) the information sought is reasona-
bly relevant to the inquiry; and (3) the demand is not unreasonably broad
or burdensome.”197
Under the statutory schemes authorizing almost all administrative
subpoenas, moreover, the recipient of a subpoena may obtain pre-en-
194 See, e.g., Leon, 468 U.S. 897.
195 Federal grand juries are composed of sixteen to twenty-three ordinary citizens from
the judicial district in which the grand jury is summoned. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a); 1
WRIGHT & LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 4TH § 102 (2008).  Fur-
thermore, the grand jury’s power to subpoena witnesses and documents is widely recognized
as quite expansive. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a); 1 WRIGHT & LEIPOLD, supra note 195, § 104. R
Even so, the grand jury “is a constitutional fixture in its own right,” and it “belongs to no
branch of the institutional government, [instead] serving as a kind of buffer or referee between
the Government and the people.”  United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992). But see
1 WRIGHT & LEIPOLD, supra note 195, § 104 (citing cases describing the central role of the R
prosecutor in grand jury investigations).  The subject of a grand jury subpoena duces tecum
may obtain pre-enforcement judicial review of the subpoena by moving to quash it under Rule
17 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2); 2 WRIGHT &
LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 4TH § 276 (2008).
196 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642–43 (1950).
197 Burlington N. R.R. v. Office of Inspector Gen., 983 F.2d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 1993).
Accord Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 652; Winters Ranch P’ship v. Viadero, 123 F.3d 327, 329
(5th Cir. 1997).  Under the relevance prong of this inquiry, information can only be subpoe-
naed if it is relevant to the specific function of the subpoenaing agency.  For example, the
Department of Defense Inspector General can only subpoena information relevant to the dis-
charge of duties concerning that Department.  Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501
(1943); United States v. Oncology Servs. Corp., 60 F.3d 1015, 1020 (3d Cir. 1995); FTC v.
Invention Submission Corp., 965 F.2d 1086, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The vast amount of public
discourse beyond those confines is immune from this process.  As to the undue burden inquiry,
although the burden itself is on the recipient of the administrative subpoena, and reasonable-
ness is assumed, courts will quash or modify subpoenas that clearly transgress reasonable
limits.  FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (en banc); In re FTC Line of Bus.
Report Litig., 595 F.2d 685, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1978).  Courts will carefully review subpoenas to
ensure that privilege is protected. See United States v. Legal Servs., 249 F.3d 1077, 1081–82
(D.C. Cir. 2001).  And they will, if necessary, enter appropriate protective orders to preserve
the confidentiality of sensitive material. See, e.g., United States v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 186
F.3d 644, 650–51 (5th Cir. 1999).
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forcement review.  In nearly all cases, an agency cannot enforce an ad-
ministrative subpoena directly, but must first seek a federal court order to
enforce the subpoena, and then if necessary, a finding of contempt from
the federal court.198
In sum, the Executive Branch maintains powerful investigative
tools, but it also must bear external checks on its ability to intrude into
the affairs of private citizens, including pre-enforcement judicial review
and the grand jury participation of ordinary citizens.
2. Broad Congressional Investigative Powers
In contrast with the Executive Branch, there are almost no pre-en-
forcement checks on the power of Congress to investigate via a compul-
sory process.  As long as a congressional subpoena falls within the
“legitimate legislative sphere” of Congress, federal courts will refuse to
enjoin Members of Congress or committees from enforcing the sub-
poena.199  As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he scope of the
power of inquiry, in short, is as penetrating and far-reaching as the poten-
tial power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.”200  Given the
dramatic expansion of congressional power in the twentieth century, the
“legitimate legislative sphere” includes an enormous swath of activity.201
Unlike traditional investigative tools of the Executive Branch, there
is no pre-enforcement external check on a congressional subpoena that is
issued pursuant to a valid legislative purpose.  Congressional subpoenas
are not typically subject to preemptive challenges, but rather can only be
challenged in defense to a civil enforcement action, defense to a criminal
contempt prosecution, or on habeas in the case of confinement by order
of a chamber of Congress.  The Supreme Court was clear on this point in
Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund.202
There, the Court dismissed a lawsuit seeking to enjoin enforcement
of a congressional subpoena and a declaration that the subpoena was in-
valid as barred by the Speech or Debate clause.203  The Court began its
analysis by noting that Speech or Debate is an absolute bar to any judi-
198 See, e.g., Legal Servs., 249 F.3d at 1080; United States v. Aero Mayflower Transit
Co., 831 F.2d 1142, 1143–44 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
199 See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503–13 (1975).
200 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959); Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504 n.15;
see supra Part I.A.
201 See CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER, supra note 34, at 54–56; see also Nat’l Fed’n of R
Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578–79 (2012) (describing Congress’s expansive
authority).
202 421 U.S. 491.
203 Id. at 496, 501.
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cial interference with Members “acting within the ‘legitimate legislative
sphere.’”204  The Court then held that:
The issuance of a subpoena pursuant to an authorized
investigation is similarly an indispensable ingredient of
lawmaking; without it our recognition that the act ‘of au-
thorizing’ is protected would be meaningless.  To hold
that Members of Congress are protected for authorizing
an investigation, but not for issuing a subpoena in exer-
cise of that authorization, would be a contradiction deni-
grating the power granted to Congress in Art. I and
would indirectly impair the deliberations of Congress.205
As a consequence, the Senate, its Members, and its staff were found to be
immune to a lawsuit questioning the issuance of the subpoena and an
action to enjoin the enforcement of the subpoena (or to have it declared
unlawful) could not be maintained.206
Conversely, the Court explained that a congressional subpoena is
reviewable in the context of enforcement actions because there, “[a]ny
interference with congressional action had already occurred when the
cases reached us, and Congress was seeking the aid of the Judiciary to
enforce its will.”207  So too review can occur through a habeas action
because there, the Writ operates not against Congress or its Members,
but upon the body of the petitioner to vindicate his rights.208  While the
subject of a congressional subpoena may raise a number of challenges to
its enforcement after being cited for contempt,209 the decision to not
comply with a congressional subpoena and face possible imprisonment is
a risky one.
The courts have broadly and repeatedly applied this principle.210
204 Id. at 503 (internal citation omitted).
205 Id. at 505.
206 Id. at 492–93, 501, 507.
207 Id. at 509 n.16.
208 See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 150, 177 (1927).
209 See CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER, supra note 34, at 62–68 (noting potential chal- R
lenges on various constitutional grounds).
210 See, e.g., McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277, 1296–98 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc)
(indicating that the “Subcommittee’s issuance of subpoenas is privileged activity” under the
Speech or Debate clause and cannot be questioned even though the basis for the search was an
illegal search), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 888 (1977), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted
sub nom. McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U.S. 189 (1978); Nelson v. United States, 208 F.2d 505,
513 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (“Though a court can no more enjoin a congressional committee from
making an unconstitutional search and seizure that it can enjoin Congress from passing an
unconstitutional bill, a court does have the power and duty to deny legal effect to either in an
action before it.”).  That said, there is language in Eastland which suggests that the Speech or
Debate Clause would not bar an action to invalidate a congressional subpoena if Congress
were engaged in specific conduct that was not “essential to legislating,” and accordingly
outside of the Speech or Debate Clause’s protection.  This language further suggests that spe-
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The only arguable judicially recognized exception to this principle is an
application of the Perlman doctrine.211
Even if one decides to roll the dice and challenge a congressional
subpoena as a defense in a criminal enforcement proceeding, the consti-
tutional restrictions on congressional subpoenas are more limited than
those on traditional Executive Branch investigatory tools.  For example,
while the Fourth Amendment’s protections against overly broad subpoe-
nas may apply to congressional subpoenas, this protection only bars a
committee from issuing process that manifestly lacks in congruence and
proportion to the inquiry under way.  If the committee issuing a sub-
poena defines its legislative inquiry broadly enough, it appears unlikely
that a court would declare the subpoena in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.212  Given the enormous range of valid legislative inquiry
cific conduct which would fall within a class of conduct deemed “essential to legislating,”
could nonetheless be deemed not “essential to legislating” by virtue of its manifest illegality.
Eastland, 421 U.S. at 508.
211 In Eastland, the subpoena sought information from a third-party bank.  Plaintiffs
sought an injunction not only against the government defendants, but also against the bank to
enjoin production.  Because the bank was never served, that portion of the action was rendered
moot. Eastland, 421 U.S. at 495 & n.4.  However, Justice Marshall, writing for himself and
Justices Brennan and Stewart, concurred in the judgment and took pains to suggest that be-
cause the Speech or Debate Clause was entirely personal to Congress and its members, a suit
to enjoin a third party from the act of production would not be barred by Speech or Debate:
“[T]he District Court properly entertained the action in order to provide a forum in which
respondent could assert its constitutional objections to the subpoena, since a neutral third party
could not be expected to resist the subpoena by placing itself in contempt.” Id. at 514 (citing
Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 12 (1918)).  In United States v. AT&T, the United States
sued to enjoin AT&T from complying with a Senate subpoena seeking records of AT&T’s
participation in a government warrantless surveillance plan.  567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
The United States asserted that the records subpoenaed implicated national security and were
subject to valid claims of executive privilege. Id. The D.C. Circuit granted a pre-enforcement
injunction against the enforcement of the congressional subpoenas, reasoning that “[t]he fact
that the Executive is not in a position to assert its claim of constitutional right by refusing to
comply with a subpoena does not bar the challenge so long as members of the Subcommittee
are not, themselves, made defendants in a suit to enjoin implementation of the subpoena.” Id.
at 129.  Importantly, the court in AT&T endorsed only a limited exception to the general rule.
Id. At its broadest, it tracks Perlman and allows a third party to bring a pre-enforcement
action to allow it to assert a claim of constitutional right or privilege. Id. Read more narrowly,
the decision is limited to its facts: the action was allowed in order to facilitate a claim of
executive privilege. See United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150, 152
(D.D.C. 1983) (suggesting such a narrow reading).
212 See McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372, 382 (1960) (noting a broad committee
inquiry and stating that “the permissible scope of materials that could reasonably be sought
was necessarily equally broad”); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187–88 (1957) (not-
ing that there “is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without
justification in terms of the functions of the Congress”); Shelton v. United States, 404 F.2d
1292, 1300–01 (D.C. Cir. 1968); CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER, supra note 34, at 64–65. R
Note also that an objection on the basis of overbreadth should be raised to the investigating
committee to give it an opportunity to respond and possibly tailor its subpoena more precisely.
McPhaul, 364 U.S. at 382; Shelton, 404 F.2d at 1299–1300; CONGRESS’S CONTEMPT POWER,
supra note 34, at 65. R
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and the courts’ reluctance to question an investigating committee’s mo-
tives,213 a Fourth Amendment overbreadth challenge does not seem to be
a strong defense for a target of a congressional investigation.
3. The Growing Executive Branch Role in Congressional
Investigations
Congress’s broad investigative powers, when combined with the
Executive Branch’s growing role in congressional investigations, present
potential concerns about the erosion of traditional safeguards that protect
personal liberties.214
Recent investigations by the Department of Justice that rely upon
the results of congressional inquiries portend the danger of an increasing
reliance on Congress’s wide-ranging powers to gather information.
Clever investigators might be able to take facts and data gathered by a
congressional committee and use that information to file civil or criminal
charges that otherwise would have been impossible to file if they had
only to rely on information-gathering tools subject to traditional restric-
tions on search warrants and grand jury subpoenas.215  Thus, given the
unique risks facing the targets of congressional investigations, one must
tread carefully following receipt of a congressional subpoena.
C. Practice Pointers for the Changing Congressional Enforcement
Landscape
In light of the foregoing developments, individuals and corporations
should respond to congressional investigations—especially those con-
ducted by committees or subcommittees with an investigative mandate—
with appropriate care.  While congressional investigations vary consider-
ably and no single prescription works in all cases, in the following sub-
sections we suggest approaches worthy of consideration in the context of
many if not most congressional investigations.
213 See, e.g., Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200–01; Shelton, 404 F.2d at 1301.
214 In a somewhat related context, a number of scholars have examined the dangers of
Congress inserting itself into open criminal investigations. See, e.g., Roberto Iraola, Congres-
sional Oversight, Executive Privilege, and Requests for Information Relating to Federal Crim-
inal Investigations and Prosecutions, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1559, 1591–93 (2002); Todd David
Peterson, Congressional Oversight of Open Criminal Investigations, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1373, 1438, 1447 (2002).  Todd Peterson has also argued that the Constitution’s separation of
powers “requires prosecutorial independence from both the lawmaking and the adjudicative
functions,” and that Congress cannot constitutionally require the Executive Branch to prose-
cute a criminal contempt citation.  Todd D. Peterson, Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials
for Contempt of Congress, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 612 (1991).
215 A recent article has highlighted potentially similar threats posed to personal liberties
by law enforcement entities utilizing the information-gathering powers of administrative agen-
cies.  Shiv Narayan Persaud, Parallel Investigations Between Administrative and Law Enforce-
ment Agencies: A Question of Civil Liberties, 39 U. DAYTON L. REV. 77 (2013).
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1. Seek Advice
Because a congressional investigation is a legal proceeding, it is
advisable that individuals and corporations subject to such an investiga-
tion obtain counsel experienced in that field.  That counsel should have
ultimate responsibility for the response to any congressional inquiry, al-
beit in close consultation with government and media relations teams.
And within a corporation, the response should be run through the general
counsel’s office.  The rationale for this is simple: the key steps of a con-
gressional investigation present a high risk of criminal or civil legal ex-
posure (as opposed to merely media or political exposure).  Lawyers are
trained to review documents for privilege and produce them in response
to subpoenas.  Lawyers also defend depositions (or de facto depositions
in the form of transcribed interviews), prepare witnesses to testify, and, if
necessary, interject legal objections during testimony.
At the same time, lawyers should not formulate strategies for con-
gressional investigations in isolation.  The most successful strategies are
created through the collaborative thinking of government affairs, media
relations, and legal teams.  Although a congressional investigation is a
legal matter, it plays out under political rules.  Accordingly, counsel must
have the ability to seamlessly integrate traditional legal representation
with an awareness of the political environment.
2. Employ Multi-Disciplinary Teams
The attorneys leading the response to a congressional investigation
should include a multi-disciplinary team that can call on relevant subject
matter experts.  In light of the increased tendency of the Executive
Branch to build on congressional probes, the response to any congres-
sional inquiry should anticipate possible Executive Branch actions.  For
example, in an investigation involving alleged Medicare overcharges,
any response must fully consider the possibility of a civil or criminal
False Claims Act proceeding down the road.  Given the specialization of
this area of law, False Claims Act experts should be integrated onto the
team so that the response can minimize downfield exposure by anticipat-
ing and proactively addressing likely Executive Branch moves.
3. Protect Privilege and Work Product
It is also critical in responding to a congressional investigation to
preserve the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.
Congress takes the position that it does not have to recognize the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, and it does not al-
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ways do so.216  Moreover, to the extent the Executive Branch is building
on a congressional investigation, it may seek to impose a privilege
waiver.  And Executive Branch attorneys would likely be able to do so
before an Article III court with minimal countervailing political or public
pressure.  To take a famous example, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr
successfully sought to depose White House attorneys regarding their re-
sponse to a HOGR investigation into the very same subject matter Starr
was investigating.217  Moreover, it is not difficult to foresee a prosecutor
attempting to impose a privilege waiver not only to obtain the defense
playbook, but also to render defense counsel a witness in order to con-
flict them out of any further representation.218
To protect against these sorts of scenarios, a congressional investi-
gations response team should be led internally by the general counsel’s
office, and externally by counsel.  Any third-party media or government
relations consultants should work for, and at the direction of counsel, and
should do so in accordance with the guidance that applicable case law
provides on the preservation of privilege.219
With regard to preparing for congressional hearings, counsel should
be present and knowledgeable of the attorney-client privilege.  If any part
of the preparation for a congressional hearing occurs without an attorney
present (or without an attorney directing and supervising the prepara-
tion), that portion of the preparation may not be protected by either the
attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine and may be discov-
erable, be it by a congressional committee or by the Executive Branch.
If an attorney is present and involved in a particular aspect of witness
preparation, the presence of a third party during a communication be-
tween a lawyer and a client may destroy the attorney-client privilege,
unless that third party is assisting the lawyer in providing legal advice.220
In such a case, the preparation session may be discoverable in its entirety
216 Hamilton, Congressional Investigations, supra note 2, at 3; Timothy Noah, Corporate R
Watchdog, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 20, 1987, at 50; Rochelle L. Stanfield, Big John’s Preserve,
NAT’L J., May 16, 1987, at 126.  To be sure, the refusal to recognize privilege was met with
considerable backlash.  It was a course of conduct that required the expenditure of considera-
ble political capital.
217 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d 910, 924 (8th Cir. 1997).
218 Cf. William E. White & Heather J. Pellegrino, Disqualifying Counsel: A New SEC
Enforcement Tactic?, LAW360 (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.law360.com/articles/187839/dis-
qualifying-counsel-a-new-sec-enforcement-tactic (discussing comments by SEC personnel
about potential conflicts of interest for counsel representing multiple clients participating in the
SEC’s “new SEC cooperation program” and an SEC motion in a case to “disqualify defense
counsel” because “[o]ne law firm was acting as counsel to all four respondents”).
219 See generally Bopp & Lay, The Availability of Common Law Privileges, supra note 5. R
220 Bopp & Lay, The Availability of Common Law Privileges, supra note 5, at 908–09. R
Of course, if an attorney controls the direction of an investigation undertaken for a legal pur-
pose, it is presumptively privileged. See, e.g., In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754
(D.C. Cir. 2014).
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unless the attorney’s comments are protected by the work product doc-
trine.  But the work product doctrine may not apply in a congressional
investigation (and in any event it is not absolute), so preservation of the
attorney-client privilege can be crucial.221
For example, the target of a congressional investigation would not
want to produce a consultant’s frank appraisal of hot documents; nor
would a chief executive officer want documents showing an attorney’s
advice about how to answer certain questions be produced prior to the
CEO’s testimony.  And imagine the company that is forced to disclose
that counsel believes the conduct under investigation may have consti-
tuted a criminal or civil offense.  Though few congressional committees
may have the resources to create a record and legal argument to justify
the imposition of a privilege waiver, in the end, that option may be avail-
able to them.
4. E-Discovery
In today’s digital world, congressional investigations increasingly
involve a great deal of electronic discovery.  Accordingly, any team re-
sponding to an inquiry involving documents should include electronic
discovery experts.  Moreover, careful attention must be paid to the fact
that there are a number of ways in which electronic discovery before
Congress is sui generis.  Most notably, there are no rules regarding elec-
tronic discovery and Congress, although many committees provide “pro-
duction instructions,” which occasionally answer some of these questions
(e.g., what media must be collected).  Practitioners are left to guess at
what duties arise when Congress places a client under a document re-
quest or a subpoena.  For example, does a voluntary letter request trigger
221 The scant authority regarding whether the work product doctrine applies to materials
prepared in anticipation of a congressional investigation is split on the critical question of
whether a congressional investigation is an adversarial proceeding sufficient to render work
created in “anticipation of litigation.”  The Restatement states that “‘Litigation’ . . . includes a
proceeding such as a grand jury or a coroner’s inquiry or an investigative legislative hearing.”
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 87 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
But as the Eighth Circuit noted in rejecting—albeit on other grounds—the argument by Hillary
Clinton and the White House that materials prepared in anticipation of congressional hearings
regarding Whitewater were covered by the work product doctrine, “[n]either the White House,
Mrs. Clinton, nor the Restatement cites any authority for this proposition . . . and [the court]
ha[s] discovered none.” In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d 910, 924 (8th Cir. 1997).  The
few cases suggesting that a congressional investigation constitutes litigation do so in passing
and with no analysis. See, e.g., In re Trasylol Prods. Liability Litig., No. 08-1928-MDL, 2009
WL 2575659, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2009); United States v. Davis, 131 F.R.D. 391, 405–06
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).  Further, the proposition that the work product doctrine is not absolute is
well established. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(A) (noting that attorney work product may be
discoverable if the party seeking the discovery “shows that it has substantial need for the
materials to prepare its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial
equivalent by other means”).
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a preservation obligation?  What level of forensic detail is required in
collection?  What types of media must be collected?  What types of me-
dia can be excluded from collection based on burden?  All of these ques-
tions lack a clear answer before Congress.  But if one guesses wrong in
answering one of these questions, he or she could end up charged either
by Congress—or more likely by the Executive Branch—with contempt
or violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 1505.
A good approach is to assume, until instructed otherwise, that the
same rules for federal criminal and civil litigation in federal court apply
to a congressional document request or subpoena.  The Executive Branch
(or Congress) would be hard pressed to prosecute someone who scrupu-
lously adhered to the rules laid down by the very Article III judges pre-
siding over the prosecution.
In line with this recommendation, the usual care should be taken to
issue appropriate litigation holds, to conduct due diligence in document
collection, and to preserve normal and appropriate mediums.  This can be
an intrusive and expensive process, but these concerns can often be ame-
liorated through negotiations with Congress to reduce the discovery bur-
den.  A detailed discovery plan drafted by experienced electronic
discovery attorneys can often go a long way in getting Congress to re-
duce the discovery burden.
5. Write Carefully and Review Diligently
In the wake of recent Executive Branch prosecutions, individuals
and companies subject to congressional investigations must use extreme
care in responding to Congress—whether in writing or in oral testimony.
Any statements of fact must be carefully drafted to ensure that they are
accurate and will not be contradicted by a later document.  And state-
ments should account for accusations of misleading by omission.  Coun-
sel should carefully vet every written document and extensively prepare
each witness with these points in mind.
As a corollary, if possible, extensive diligence should be exercised
to ensure that statements will not be undermined by subsequent discov-
ery.  While it may be tempting to think that little preparation is required
to withstand a five-minute cross-examination by a Member of Congress,
that mentality can bear disastrous consequences.
To be sure, because Congress is a political entity, it is beholden to
the news cycle, and it often demands information on a timeframe that
does not allow thorough preparation.  In such cases, it is prudent to lay a
record that clearly reflects that the target is not prepared to respond be-
cause it is completing its internal diligence.  If Congress nonetheless in-
sists on a response or live testimony, that response or testimony should
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be caveated to reflect the fact that it is being provided without the proper
diligence and is subject to change.
CONCLUSION
Congressional investigations can pose challenges that extend be-
yond the confines of Congress, not only as a product of the subject mat-
ter under investigation, but also as a result of the way in which
investigative targets respond to the inquiry.  If a committee conducting
an investigation believes that a witness has not responded forthrightly or
has misled the committee, it could refer the matter to Executive Branch
enforcement authorities.  More daunting, however, is the possibility that
the Department of Justice or another agency could prosecute a witness in
a congressional investigation without a referral.  That the Executive
Branch seems to increasingly view congressional investigations as poten-
tial sources of charges to bring in high-profile prosecutions counsels cau-
tion.  Subjects of congressional investigations thus should resist the long-
held view that absent extraordinary circumstances, a congressional inves-
tigation is an exercise in governmental relations.  It is not.  It is a legal
proceeding that plays out in a high-profile political setting and should be
treated accordingly.
